أوراق بقلم كرزون بشأن الشرق الأدنى والأوسط [و‎‎٢‎٢] (٣٤٨/٤٣)

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty s Government.]
Printed for the War Cabinet. June 1919
•SECRET.
Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby.
(No. 876.)
My Lord, Foreign Office, June 11, 1919.
AFTER an absence of a fortnight, the French Ambassador, who had again been
to Paris in the interval, resumed his conversations with me this afternoon.
On the occasion of our last interview he had expatiated upon the differences that
had arisen in the Council of Three or Four in Paris concerning the future of Syria,
which had produced such strong feeling between tho Prime Ministers of France and
Great Britain. He now came to explain to me that an even more regrettable situation
had arisen out of the proposal of the British representatives to modify at the eleventh
hour the terms of the peace proposals to Germany. He enumerated with accuracy the
three points upon which this modification had been attempted, and he found nothing to
say in favour of any of them. He expressed extreme astonishment that the result of
six months of labour, of countless committees and commissions, of so many hopes and
disappointments, should be thrown over or threatened at the last moment owing to
discoveries which ought to have been made before. The effect produced upon French
official opinion had been very bad, and it was even said that, at one moment, a rupture
of relations between the plenipotentiaries of the two Great Powers had been threatened.
For his own part, he was quite convinced, and so were the French Government,
that the Allies had only to stand together in order to compel Germany to sign. He
did not attach the least importance to her bluff or bravado. She was only attempting
to profit by the alleged disagreement between the Allies. She had nothing to sustain
her in resistance, nothing to fall back upon in retreat ; and, if only a firm front were
exhibited to her, she would without a shadow of doubt give way. That, at any rate,
was his forecast of the future. Further, his Excellency remarked that, while it was
the genera] impression in Paris that the British Prime Minister and the American
President had hitherto acted for the most part in combination, and had promoted each
other’s views, on this occasion President Wilson’s sympathies w 7 ere said to lie with the
French rather than with ourselves. The Ambassador was the more concerned at the
existence of these serious differences "between our two countries, because he believed
them to originate from internal political considerations affecting the British Government
mainly or alone. He felt convinced that it was in response to Socialist pressure that
the British representatives had taken up this line. If this were so, he thought that it
would greatly increase the already considerable momentum that had been acquired by
international Socialistic propaganda during the past few months.
I replied that, so far from the British Prime Minister having yielded to any pressure
of the sort to which the Ambassador referred, an allegation of this description had
been expressly denied in Parliament; and I could testify to the fact that the decisions
arrived at and put forward by Mr. Lloyd George at the meeting of the Council of Four
were those, not of himself alone, but of the British War Cabinet and Empire
Delegation, specially convened in Paris for the purpose. I had myself been prevented
by indisposition from attending these meetings; but, having read a full account of
what had passed, I was at liberty to tell the Ambassador that the action to which he
objected had been endorsed by the unanimous voice of those who were present, and,
whether it was wise or unwise, it represented the considered opinion of the British
Government.
The Ambassador did not know whether anything had been done to ease the strained
situation which had arisen in consequence, nor had I any information which could
give him relief on this point.
I told him, however, that our information as to the intention of the Germans was
not quite identical with his. The chances of a refusal to sign seemed greater than lie
had allowed for, and I could quite well conceive that dictates ot the highest political
expediency might suggest a modification of terms that would ensure a reluctant
signature in preference to an obstinate refusal.
Passing from these subjects, I said it was my duty to call the attention of
M. Gambon to a number of points of minor interest which, however, were not without
their effect upon the relations of our two Governments and peoples. For some time
past his Excellency had deplored to me the feelings of irritation that had been reported
[2097]