أوراق بقلم كرزون بشأن الشرق الأدنى والأوسط [ظ‎‎٢‎٠] (٣٤٨/٤٠)

2
any reason why the French should not be allowed to stake out their claims m <
portion of the Turkish dominions which was Arab and not Turkish in character, and c
which the Ottoman Government would in any circumstances be deprivec , , T
I said that a bad example was not the same thing as a good precedent, and that
I hoped his Excellency would bear in mind my warning. , , ,
In the course of our conversation, M. Gambon revealed to me what appeared to
a complete ignorance on his part of the final stages of the communications between the
Amir Feisal' and M. Clemenceau. He assured me that these had been thoroughly
satisfactory; that the protecting and civilising mission which I ranee had modestly
prescribed*'for herself in Syria, was thoroughly understood and loyally accepted by t
Amir ; and consequently that the appearance of the French troops upon the scene
would he welcomed by none more heartily than by him. _
I said that I had always hoped that the Paris conversations would result m such
an understanding, but that was not exactly my reading of the documents recording the
final interviews. I had seen the letter from M. Glemenceau to Amir Feisa , m \\ nc i ie
had asked his assent to certain general propositions defining the French attitude and
claims. To this the Amir had returned a reply, which I had also seen, oi a veiy
cautious and non-committal character, which was far from connoting that complete
acceptance of the French point of view to which his Excellency had referred. 1
suo-crested that he should take an early opportunity of inspecting these documents
C Finally, M. Gambon pressed upon me the plea that, upon the withdrawal o ie
British forces from Syria, the French troops would be urgently required for the
elementary task of preserving order in the territories concerned.
I refrained from observing that there was a likelihood that their presence mig i
have a precisely opposite effect. ? ^ t? .
The conversation on this subject ended by my undertaking to refer the french
military proposals to General Allenby. .
M. Gambon then embarked upon his weekly discussion of the political situation at
Paris, or rather Versailles. He thought that the speech of the chief German repre
sentative had been impertinent in tone ; but his own reading of the German psychology
was that, after a more or less theatrical display, the Germans would m due course
accept the terms that w^ere offered to them. He derived this impression, he said, not
merely from a study of German mentality, but from the reports received from french
officers in different parts of Germany, who described the state of disorganisation and
debility there as worse than anything we had hitherto believed.
I said that our own reports differed somewhat according to the paits op Germany
from which they came, but that the majority of them certainly conveyed the impression
of the writers that the peace terms, if they were found to be very severe, would not be
accepted. This was the view which I personally was inclined to hold, and 1 asked the
Ambassador whether, if the French or the British were in the position of the Germans
at this moment, he thought that either of us would accept the treaty that was
propounded yesterday in Versailles. .
Certainly not, he replied. In 1870 the French had declined so much as to consider
the idea of an armistice, and, although thoroughly vanquished, they had fought on fox
six months with enfeebled forces until peace was signed. . the Butish would ha\e done
the same. But German mentality was of an entirely different order, and groans and
moans would, in his opinion, be followed by sulky submission. _
M. Gambon spoke also of the proposed compromise about Fiume, which had been
negotiated by the French Ambassador in Rome ; but he did not see in it anything more
than an extemporised and provisional solution of an almost insoluble pioblem.
The conversation revealed his Excellency once more as the very antipodes of an
optimist about the European situation.
T nnvp /VP
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.