أوراق بقلم كرزون بشأن الشرق الأدنى والأوسط [ظ‎‎٨] (٣٤٨/١٦)

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and revivified Russia would arise, who would insist upon extending her borders ami-
recovering as much as possible of her former sway The ambitions of such a State might
once moi e take the direction ol Constantino|le, and 1 foresaw that m sudi a case a neu
international question ol the gravest importance might arise in the conflict that would
ensue between a reunited Russia and the Great Power established at Constantinople.
The Ambassador concurred in this reasoning, and thought that tins was a dangei
to be avoided by every possible means. , . _ . , ,
Accepting the impossibility of a Great Power, h,s Excellency then went on to say
that the only alternative was an international control ot the most stringent and effective
character. He hoped that France and Great Britain would put their heads together
with a view to producing the most powerful instrument ot this description that could
The Ambassador next gave his reply to the remarks which I had made a week
earlier about the general ambitions of France. His contention was that I was entirely
mistaken in crediting her with imperialistic or aggressive ambitions, and that at every
point her aspirations were, on the contrary, moderate in the extreme. I aking me over
the whole field under discussion, he began by pointing out that h ranee had not any of
the desires with which she bad been credited with regard to Morocco, fehe did not
wish to interfere with the Spanish zone or with the international administration ot
Algeciras, and to be released by the signatory Powers from the obligations into v hich
she had then entered. >
I said that the Spanish Ambassador, who had visited me halt-an-hour earlier, had
expressed the gratification ot his Government at the receipt of similar assurances from
Paris, and that it was a matter of universal satisfaction that, the atmosphere was thus
cleared. I .myself thought that the misunderstanding, if it were such, hod arisen
from the Statement made at the Supreme Council in Paris by M. de Peretti, which
certainly suggested implications much more advanced than those which were now
stated by the Ambassador.
The latter replied that excuses must be made for an official who was both
youthful and enthusiastic, and who had taken perhaps undue advantage of the
opportunity of stating a case for the Department which he represented.
As regards the Act of Algeciras, I said that, in common with the other
signatories, we should have to see that no interests of our own, commercial or
otherwise, were jeopardised by the proposal to abrogate it.
To this his Excellency replied that our full commercial rights were secured by
other treatv engagements between our two countries.
M. Cam bon then passed to the discussion of the French claims on the Phine
frontier, and expounded at some length the case, with which we are already very familiar,
as to the petil in which France will stand and the securities which are required to
meet it. He explained the French ideas as to a buffer State, and expressed a warm
hope that they wmuld meet with our sympathy.
I said that the pioposal raised two issues, military and political. Politically, we
should of course be in warm sympathy with any plan that gave guarantees for the
future safety of our Ally, provided that this could he done, as I understood was
proposed, without injury to the sentiments or interests ol the populations concerned.
From the military point of view, the arrangement that had at first beerq proposed had
seemed to us to be open to serious objection. I alluded to the proposal of Marshal
Foch tnat international garrisons should be provided, apparently in perpetuity, to hold
the bridgeheads of the Rhine. I said that, whatever France might do on her own
account, it was in my view incredible that the British Parliament would admit the
maintenance, whether by voluntary or compulsory enlistment, of a force, say of , r )0,000
men, for perpetual employment on the Rhine. The military proposals would, I thought,
assume a more practicable shape if they were directed to depriving the suggested areas
of any military or offensive strength in the future. If the creation of a buffer State
could sensibly delay the attack of an enemy beyond the Ehine, even if it did not.
completely prevent it, the suggestion seemed well worthy of consideration.
Passing to the East, the Ambassador resumed his former complaints about the
British attitude in Mosul, Syria, and those parts of the world, and he enquired why we
had not months ago, and, indeed, why we did not now, frankly state what we wanted
about Mosul, and so come to terms with the French. He was at a loss to understand
why there should be so much dispute and misconception on the matter.