"معلومات عامة عن بلاد فارس لأي طبعة مستقبلية، ١٨٩٥" [و‎‎٣‎١] (٢١١/٥٦)

OUR TRADE WITH THE PERSIAN GULF.
OUR TRADE WITH THE PERSIAN GULF. 1 7
The second portion, of about another 500 miles, would take
in the three largest cities in Persia,—Shiraz, Ispahan, and
Teheran. This portion of the line would most assuredly pay.
Finally, the last portion would be from Teheran to either Tiflis,
vi& Tabreez, in a North-Westerly direction, or due westward,
that is into Turkish territory. In the former case, this portion
would be constructed by Russia; in the latter by Great Britain.
If however, the latter Power should elect to connect with
Turkey, there would remain a further portion to be constructed
in Turkey to connect with the Mediterranean, at the same
time that the connection with Tiflis would remain. This route
which we have sketched, is the most natural and easy and
simple. It would be the only paying route. It would run
through Persia along its entire length, and unite its principal
cities. It would also supply the whole of the cross line,
except the Russian portion from Teheran to Tiflis. From
Bunder Abbas to Teheran the line would be common for
both directions—East and West, and North and South. The
shortest line from Bunder Abbas to Teheran is by way of
Yezd ; but, if that course were taken, the large cities and
trading centres of Shiraz and Ispahan would be neglected,
and this cannot be recommended. It is possible that, in the
far future of railway enterprise in Persia, Meshed may be
united with Bunder Abbas by way of Kerman, which, again,
may be united with Kandahar or Chaman.
The view we have taken above is that taken by Mr. Curzon
in his work on Persia, differing only from his as regards
the first portion from Kurrachee. He would have the line from
Quetta or Chaman. His considerations, however, were strate
gical. We have shown the objections to it. It would not
pay; it would have to cross an extensive desert; it would
neglect some of the largest trade centres and cities of Persia ;
it would not be agreed to by Russia ; an extensive cross-con
nection would have to be made with the Persian Gulf; and
the fears of Russia penetrating by Western Beluchistan to the
Indian Ocean—on which Mr. Curzon enlarges—are purely
chimerical.
For the view we have taken in favour of the line starting
from Kurrachee, we have the high authority of Sir Frederick
Goldsmid, than whom no one is better qualified to offer an
opinion, as he has himself been over the ground, which
Mr. Curzon has not. The sum, then, of what we have urged is
this :—The line is not to be largely a British strategic line, but
a purely commercial line for British India, Persia, and even
Russia, We are surely not afraid, under equal conditions, of
Russia cutting us out in trade. If we are, we had better
dismiss the whole subject, and frankly confess that it is not
Russia, but England, that bars the way to the commercial
development of Persia. The line, beginning from Kurrachee,
would proceed in a North-West direction, in the latter part
agreeing with Mr. Curzon’s idea. We must give a quid pro
quo to Russia for our connection with Kurrachee, by giving
up the connection of Teheran with Tiflis to Russia. As
a quid pro quo tor a. further Ru-sian connection of the Trans-
Caspian railway with Meshed and the Eastern provinces,—
as it has a strong strategical bearing,—we should have an
extension westward from Quetta to Kerman, or Yezd. Mr.
Curzon says, in his work on Persia : “ British energy will do
wisely to direct itself to the improvement of those routes rather
than to the attempted recovery of lost ascendancy in the
North,” and in this lie agrees with us that we should do what
we can, instead of attempting the impossible, and give Russia
a quid pro quo, where she already has a footing, and natur
ally must have, for what we take ourselves.
We continue the Trunk line from India ; and Russia connects
Tiflis with Teheran, and thus with the Persian Gulf. It will be
observed that the objections urged by the Indian Government
to the extension from Quetta, noticed by Mr. Curzon, do not
apply to our route. Thus, thoroughly disarming the jealousy of
Russia, and giving her her due share from Tiflis and on to the
Persian Gulf, and the line being commercially paying, there
would remain no further difficulty in a question that has hitherto
been so obscured by jealousies and extraneous considerations.
If we can establish this railway, we get rid of half the Egyp
tian trouble, immensely increase our trade, civilise Persia and
render her strong. With reference to an Indo-Mediterranean
railway, Persia, as Mr. Curzon says, plays a 0 prominent part,”
and, therefore, the future of Persian railways is “ endowed
with a more than local importance.” The longer Russia pursues
an illiberal policy of obstruction, the stronger will grow
England’s hold on the trade, wealth, and national life of Persia.
The question of Persian railways is, as Mr. Curzon
puts i£ “ in the air.” Russia is now peaceably disposed ;
we have an able minister in Sir Mortimer Durand ; and every
circumstance seems to be favourable for settling this much
vexed question. f
But other obstacles to trade exist in Persia besides want of
railways and roads. We have referred to one or two of these
such as the want of a stable government, and the weakness of
the central authority, which are of extreme importance even
for trade ; and there are several others besides. As for the
weakness of the government, it may be J ren ;^ be [ ed , ^ f ^ e
stated that a petty Arab revolt near Bunder Abbas had had the
effect of seriously interfering with its trade during the year we are