"مذكرات وذكريات مسؤول في الخدمة السياسية الهندية" [و‎‎٤‎١] (١٥٦/٨١)

of solving the problem. We decided that Shell should start adding to their slender
petrol stocks a proportion of ethyl alcohol which was a by-product of the sugar cane
industry in the State. We started with a 12% addition, but all we succeeded in doing was
to immobilize at one stroke the engines of all our civilian cars and lorries! The
mixture was too rich, and so it was gradually reduced until we found that at about 8%
it was just adequate to produce efficient combustion and traction. Food, too, was
becoming scarce, and eventually - just before I left Hyderabad in March 1944 - we were
compelled to resort to the rationing of food grains - wheat flour and grain. Food shops
were set up to distribute a ration of about 12 ounces of these food grains per person.
Providentially, as time went on the Japanese abandoned whatever plans they might have
had for carrying the war to the land mass of the Deccan, but of course we were not to
know this.
But during the summer of 1943, the Government of India was faced with another and
very alarming situation from an unexpected quarter, hampering the prosecution of the
war against the Japanese. This time the danger arose internally in India itself.
The Indian National Congress Party, which had at all times looked upon the entry into
the war of the Indian Empire on the side of the allies with much disfavour, eventually
decided to come out in open opposition to its further prosecution on any of the several
fronts. Sedition and subversion were openly preached; attempts were made to suborn
units of the Indian Army. In the strategic areas of the United Provinces, in B^har
and in Bengal, rail communications vital to the Allied Armies fighting the Japanese
forces on the Assam/Burma front, were attacked and in some cases actually sabotaged.
The situation became so dangerous, that finally the Government of India was compelled
to take action. The Congress Party was proscribed and its leaders arrested - chief
amongst whom were Mahatma Gandhi, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, and Vallabafaffit Patfil.
The effect was instantaneous; rioting and acts of terrorism broke out in many cities
in northern India and Bengal.
The position in the State of Hyderabad complicated the issue. Its Ruler, the Nizam,
was Muslim, as were all his ministers, senior officials in all departments of Govern
ment, and all military officers of the Army and the Police. But the vast majority of
his 13 million subjects were Hindu and, as such, could be expected to harbour pro-
Congress sympathies. The Nizam's Government was however autocratic: it would not,
and did not tolerate opposition to its rule from any quarter. Local discontent arising
out of opposition to the policies of the Indian Government could very easily degenerate
into open rebellion against the Muslim dynasty of the Nizam. Consequently the unrest
in British India was not allowed to communicate itself to the State. But Secunderabad
was different - the Hyderabad Authorities had no jurisdiction in the 'leased areas' where
the predominantly Hindu population enjoyed rights and institutions denied to their