"مذكرات وذكريات مسؤول في الخدمة السياسية الهندية" [و‎‎١‎١] (١٥٦/٢١)

11
The Minister, having discussed the matter with his senior staff (but not with his
foreign diplomatic colleagues), radioed the Foreign Office in the sense of my report
suggesting that consideration be urgently given to the reinforcement of the existing
military escort by not less than a self-sufficient company of British regular infantry.
The urgency arose from the fact that there was strong evidence to indicate that the
Italian Armies would commence hostilities on the northern and southern fronts
(Eritrea and Somaliland) as soon as the rainy seasons ceased in the first week of
October. It was now the middle of June, and something had to be done very quickly
indeed. After a few days, the Foreign Office reply was received (I should add at
this stage that the Legation was one of the few British diplomatic missions in the
world to have been equipped with its own long range wireless facilities. But "long
range" was then a relative term. The range of our set enabled us to reach other
British military installations in Aden, Ismailiaand Khartoum only. Ismailia in Canal
Zone was our relay station. Electrical atmospheric storms were frequent in Addis Ababa
during the rainy season and made wireless reception and transmission a purgatory for
our single operator. Some months later a second operator was posted to us^ The
Foreign Office reply to our telegram was to the effect that the British troops could
not be 'for military purposes to a foreign country with which HMG were at peace. In
any event they could not be supplied from the air, and without considerable ancillary
non-combattant services they could not be maintained. However, further consideration
was being given to other solutions. A few days later came another cypher signal to
say that an alternative plan to send us native troops of the Sudan Defence Force had
also been explored and rejected. The constitution of the Force precluded it from
serving outside the Sudan in peace time.
At this stage I suggested to the Minister that perhaps the Government of India might
be approached; many of the British commercial community in Ethiopia were Indians,
and we already had some Indian troops in the shape of the Cavalry Escort. Sir Sidney
Barton was enthusiastic about this suggestion. He had had Indian troops in Shanghai at
his disposal in 1929;and the Settlement Police Force, of which he entertained the
highest regard, were largely Sikhs. Accordingly I drafted a telegram for him asking
the F.O. to pass our request to New Delhi. We specifically asked for a Company of
Sikh Infantry with the necessary complement of British Officers as well as a Medical
Officer. As we envisaged a possible prolonged onslaught on the Legation, we suggested
the addition of machine guns, infantry mortars and search lights (these were for
denying the hill-top to the Mob ). We also needed large reserves of ammunition and
medical supplies. Finally the list contained a request for 3,000 gas masks as the
fear was prevalent that the Italians were planning to use aerial poison gas in their
campaign.