"تقرير عن الجيش الفارسي جُمع في فرع الاستخبارات لإدارة قائد الإمداد والتموين في الهند من قبل الملازم ج. أ. دوجلاس، فرقة رماة الرماح الثانية في البنغال" [ظ‎‎١‎١‎٦] (٢٢/٢٢)

certain that no more than that number would be forthcoming if brought to the
unerring test of a well-paid enlistment.”
He goes on to say : “ There is a greater number of what may be termed
the second class sowar—that is, men mounted on inferior nags, with clothes
frequently in rags, and arms either of local (Isfahan) make or the better looking
Martini, but with a broken mechanism. Sometimes a sword is added, but not
usually. , Of such men, equally brave and equally hardy, but without the attempt
at polish due to a turn with the troops at Shustar or Teheran, there may be
1,000 over and above the 500 previously mentioned. I would not count on one
more. After the sowar comes the tufangchi, that is, the footman armed with a
tufang, a long smooth-bore gun, locally made matchlock, or with an old Enfield
lock. Of these there may be 2,000 or 3,000. They are all hardy mountaineers;
excellent, but remorseless, sportsmen.”
Further on he says: “The estimates of the fighting strength of the
Bakhtiaris and Lurs are varied. T heir own estimates are invariably on an exag
gerated scale, not only of their fighting men, but also of their total numbers.
It is not believed that the Bakhtiaris could muster any force that in the open
one battalion of British infantry, European or Native, could not blow into space,
or at least beyond the visible horizon. Very few arms of precision are to, be
found amongst them, the majority having anything but serviceable weapons.”
He considers that as enemies the Bakhtiari armed forces are insignifi
cant and -of no account, but that as auxiliaries they would be of immense
value.
“ The only portion of their fighting forces worth considering would be some
of their mounted men, to be used solely as guides, mounted infantry, and skirters,
the latter term meaning groups of men hovering on the skirt of an. enemy, raid
ing where possible on a small scale, and bringing in any information of import
ance. They should never act in large bodies, that is, never more than a
hundred or so together, and their leader should be their own selected chief, or
appointed by the Ilkhani, and should be entirely under the orders of the Intelli
gence staff in the field. In such hands they would be invaluable. Brigaded
with our own cavalry or other troops, they would be useless and soon dissolved.
The above remarks apply to their extempore use as they now exist, and about
1,000 to 1,500 could be counted on as available within a month of the demand
being made.”
* * ' * * * * *
<t As orderlies, as scouts, look-out men, and in time of action as daring
flankers on the higher ground, they would be invaluable. They would have to
be armed by us, and with a little drilling the first principles of Western discipline
would be gradually imparted to bear fruit eventually.”— (Sawyer.)
1 st August i8q2.
J. A. DOUGLAS, Lieutenant,
2nd Bengal Lancers*