ملف ١١٦٦/ ١٩٢٥ "الجزيرة العربية: نجد؛ المفاوضات مع ابن سعود بشأن مسألة العراق-نجد وحدود شرق الأردن؛ بعثة السير ج. كلايتون؛ اتفاقية بحرة، الثاني من نوفمبر ١٩٢٥" [ظ‎‎١‎٣‎٣] (٧٦٩/٢٧٣)

the other hazid, had, through his stall, put up unofficial memoranda
summarising his views on the subject, and between the two points
of view there was wide divergence. I lelt that the general issues
were so important that it was essential that no hasty decision should
be taken and that the whole situation should be considered very care
fully. 1 had given His Highness detailed reasons for the attitude of
His Majesty’s Government, which was dictated largely by considera
tions of a military nature, and in this connection I would draw his
attention to the appointment as High Commissioner in Palestine of
Field-Marshal Lord Plumer, a very distinguished soldier, by whom
the defensive aspect was naturally regarded with especial interest.
I would, however, ask His Highness to leave the question of Kaf
for the moment and bear with me while I gave a brief appreciation
on his own position in regard to Great Britain as it struck me.
No one had a more complete knowledge of the internal situation in
Arabia, than His Highness, but he might be interested in what I had
to say speaking from a wider point of view. Yesterday His High
ness had given me privately a short history of his own career, from
which it was obvious that he had performed a wonderful task in
restoring and expanding the fortunes of his family and of his
country. But that very expansion must inevitably bring him into
closer contact with the outside world, and he would then feel
increasingly the need of a powerful friend to assist him in dealing
with forces to which he had not hitherto been exposed. His High
ness had already signified his strong desire for complete friendship
and co-operation with Great Britain, but I should like to bring home
to him some of those factors in the situation which rendered such a
friendship essential to the welfare of Nejd.
I then made a brief review of Imperial interests and policy in
regard to India, the Persian Gulf, the Red .Sea, the Sudan, Egypt,
Palestine, Trans-Jordan and ‘Iraq, giving Ibn Sa'ud an implied
reminder of the fact that his country was completely encircled by
British possessions or spheres of influence, and emphasizing the
advantages to him of complete understanding and cordial co-opera
tion with Great Britain.
There was nothing extravagant, I added, in the demands of His
Majesty’s Government, and I would ask him, while reflecting on the
position of the British Armies at the close of the war, to consider
what Great Britain could have demanded then if her policy had been
one of aggrandisement and conquest. It was for His Highness to
appreciate the value he attached to the friendship of Great Britain
and the measure of sacrifice he was prepared to make to attain it.
Great Britain’s sympathy with Arab aspirations was well known,
and I for my part should not fail to explore every possible avenue
with a view to reaching a satisfactory understanding. I suggested
that he would do well to consider the situation and reflect further
on our discussions to date. I then proposed that we either adjourn
or proceed to another point.
Ibn Sa‘ud replied that he fully realized the position of Great
Britain in the Near and Middle East and that he prized British
friendship very highly. It was essential for Arab countries in their
own interests to seek the friendship of Great Britain and to formulate
their policy on the basis of that friendship. If, however, Great
Britain had been ready to spend so much in men and money in order
to secure the friendship of some of those countries which I had