تقارير وأوراق للجنة الإدارة المصرية [داخلي‎-‎خلفي‎] (١٠٨/١٠٧)

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty’s Government.]
Printed for the War Cabinet. March 1918.
SECRET.
G.-162.
REPORT OF
THE EGYPTIAN ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE.
( r Ihis Report was written by Lord Curzon, and adopted by the Committee.)
THE appointment by the War Cabinet of a Committee to consider the future
conduct ot Egyptian administration in this country arose out of a Paper, submitted
^ A 01 . r" c wai t r hecil, proposing the immediate creation of a separate Department
or Ministry m London, distinct from the Foreign Office both in its location, staff,
and traditions, though nominally under the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
ns Department was advocated on tjie ground that the affairs of Egypt had already
become, and with the close of the war would in an ever-increasing degree continue
to be, administrative rather than political; and that, as such, they required treat
ment by experts with special experience such as the Foreign Office staff could not
except m raie and accidental circumstances, provide. It was contemplated that
such a Department might, if the close of the war left both Aden, Arabia and
possibly Mesopotamia either m British hands or under a British Protectorate,
expand into an entirely new organisation which might be divorced from the Foreign
Office altogether. b
These proposals were supported in evidence by Sir H. McMahon, but were con
tested m printed memoranda submitted by Sir R. Graham and Lord Hardinge
and m oral evidence by Sir M. Cheetham.' ’
Mr Storrs wrote a draft report which, while correctly interpreting the general
sense ol the evidence and the broad deductions to be drawn from the enquirv
appeared to import into the proceedings of the Committee an undue proportion
fjie evidence itself, and to be more precise and definite than was justified by
what had actually taken place.,
Lord Milner subsequently wrote a note in which he placed himself on the
whole, definitely on the side of Lord Edward Cecil.
At a still later date, a note by Mr. Montagu, Secretary of State for India,
who had stopped m Egypt on his way out to India, was circulated to the War
Cabinet, m which he adumbrated, as the future solution of this Eastern problem
the perpetuation of something like the present Middle East Committee, providing
tor the due co-ordination of the Home with the Indian points of view.
In these circumstances it is not easy to construct a report which will do full
justice to all these varying views, or succeed in fusing them into a harmonious
Neveitheless, there was, I think, a sufficient preponderance of opinion in favour
. cer ^. ain propositions to justify an effort to place them on record, both for
immediate use and possibly for ulterior action.
1. there was a general agreement that, should the war result in placing the
administrative control of Mesopotamia and Arabia in British hands, there would
require to be a new Department in the Home Government to deal specifically with
these problems, together with those of Aden, Egypt, and the Sudan. What form
it should take, whether it should or should not be a Department of the Foreign
Office, it was unnecessary and would be premature to decide; though the preponder
ance of opinion was clearly opposed to any complete divorce from the Foreign
Office. &
2. A second alternative, which might present itself at the close of the war
would be the administration by the British Government of Egypt, including the
cm dan and Aden, together with the political relations of the Hejaz, assuming this
kingdom to survive, but without Mesopotamia and Arabia in its broadest sense,
assuming the two latter not to pass into the British sphere. For such a contino-ency.
“gam, the creation of a new organisation might very likely be required.
3 Palestine, which had not then been successfully invaded, was not mentioned.
But whatever the form of future political control, whether British or international
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