"تقرير عن المسح الأولي لمسار خط التلغراف الفارسي المركزي الممتد من كويته إلى بم وفهرة" [ظ‎‎٥‎٨] (١٦٢/١٢١)

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the Nushki trade route from becoming a financial success, but,_ even assuming
that it could become prosperous, its life would still be precarious. Whatever
flow of trade it can get is only on the condition that the routes through Afgha
nistan remain closed. This condition will last only on the supposition that the
Afghan Government continues unprogressive, and ignorant of its own advan
tages, which is improbable, or, to say the least, uncertain. A great deal of
favourable, and, 1 think, unwarranted prophecy has been published about the
Xushki trade route, but, before any of this can be accepted, some satisfactory
statement of its claims for success is necessary. I do not know whether this
trade route is being forced on as a commercial enterprise, or as a move of
political importance. My criticisms are directed on the assumption that the
former is partly the case. The official and other reports on the subject certainly
lead one to believe that the route possesses great intrinsic value commercially.
As regards the political side of the question, I do not, of course, attempt to ex
press any opinion.
However, assuming that the Telegraph Department will derive permanent
assistance from the Quetta-Nushki-Siestan trade rouie, the advisability of
bringing an important telegraph line along this way is still doubtful. In the
concluding paragraph of my former report on the route north of the Koh-i Sultan,
I summed^up the difficulties that would be encountered : viz., (i) quantity of
drifting sand met with, (2) scarcity of water, (3) the total absence of supplies
and labour over the greater part of the distance, (4) transport cannot be obtained
when required at short notice, (5^ climatic conditions unfavourable, and violent
storms frequently occur, (6) "the route lies through a comparatively unsettled
country, and telegraph wires along it would be exposed to malicious damage
from raiders and local malcontents, and (7) restoration of communication in case
of interruptions would be liable to such long delay, owing to the difficulty in
procuring labour and transport locally, that telegraph traffic would be rendered
most uncertain and insecure. All of these difficulties still exist along the route
now under report, except that the quantity of sand met wuth is not so great.
The route from Teheran to Karachi, m& Yezd, Kerman, Bam, Pahra, Magas,
and Bela, is, primd facie, the most direct one, and passes through the most fertile
and populated region of what is at its best a poor country. A great portion of
Persia north of t’ e line this route takes, with the exception of part of Khorassan,
is, I think, of little value. The route from Bam to Quetta will pass through almost
the maximum amount of desert, 600 miles at least, scarce in water, and devoid of
transport, labour, and supplies. Any advantages that may be urged to influence
a decision in the latter’s favour will require very careful consideration. What they
can be I do not know. It is usually easy enough to get into a quagmire, but to
progress through one, 0: git out again, is more difficult. So it is with the country
between Quetta and Bam. A lot of tempting literature has been written to draw
on expensive projects. By spending enough money, a telegraph line can readily
be constructed through it, but to maintain this in efficient order, and to ensure
that telegraph traffic will not be subject to undue delay, will be more difficult.
Considering all the circumstances, I am unable to recommend that the
Central Persian telegraph line be extended to India, md Ladis, or Koh-i-Malik
Seah, unless, as I have said before, it should be proved impossible to select a
more favourable route elsewhere.
H. A. ARMSTRONG,
Assistant Superintendent of Telegraphs.