رسائل وأوراق بخصوص السكة الحديدية العابرة لبلاد فارس والسكك الحديدية الأخرى في بلاد فارس [و‎‎٢‎١‎٢] (٤٤٢/٤٢٣)

693 Persia. [24 July 1912] Persia. 694
and the British spheres of interest and
activity in Persia. I do see in the not
distant future India, and the British
Government on behalf of India, being driven i
to do something in defence of those interests
in the South which it is absolutely necessary
for the safety of our Indian Empire we
should safeguard. I do see Persian inde
pendence gradually being crushed out of
existence before our eyes. The noble
Marquess concluded by saying he could not
be very hopeful, and that there were not
many bright spots on the horizon. I see no
single bright spot on the horizon. I see i
dark clouds rolling up, pregnant with ,
danger and with risk, not merely to Persia
but to our future relations with Russia and !
to the interests of the Indian Empire itself.
I am sorry to speak in what the noble
Marquess, I am sure, would tell me is a very
pessimistic and gloomy fashion. I would
gladly say that I think things are going ;
well. But when I am familiar with this *
state of things how can I allow my con- i
science to be lulled by the facile expressions
that fall from Ministers, and to say that |
things are well when I know them to be
bad and believe them to be getting worse ? '
As regards what the noble Marquess said
in direct reply to Lord Lamington, there
was one point he did not allude to—I think
he forgot it. The noble Lord behind me
sought from His Majesty’s Government a
repetition, which I am sure they would be
prepared to give, of this very definite pledge
about the ex-Shah. The ex-Shah was a
curse to his country while he w r as in it,
and he ought never to be allowed to return.
A most definite pledge has been given
in that respect, and my noble friend
sought nothing more than to be told that
that is a pledge to which His Majesty’s
Government will faithfully adhere.
The noble Marquess made one point to
which it is only fair that I should allude in |
passing. He said the Russian Govern
ment themselves, both at headquarters and
through their representative at Teheran, j
have been quite loyal to the terms of
the Agreement. I, of course, fully accept j
that assurance. Indeed, any one who
knows the Russian Minister at Teheran
at the present moment, Monsieur Poklevsky, j
would be confident that he would con- j
duct the relations between his Govern
ment and our own in a perfectly straight
forward and honourable way. But the
noble Marquess laid his finger on what is
^he weak spot in the situation. There are ]
always agents who interpret the policy of
their Government in a more extreme sense
and divert it to the gratification of their
own political ambitions. That is the
serious feature of the position. What is
more serious still is that it is these extreme
elements who get the better of the Minister.
Therefore while you are getting the fullest
assurances from your Russian allies, the
Agreement between you and them is being
almost neutralised by the illicit and
extravagant action of their subordinates.
The noble Marquess alluded to two
other points. The first was the question
of loans. I quite grant that the question
of loans is one of great difficulty, because,
as the noble Marquess very justly pointed
out, you cannot give a loan without some
security, and the Persian Government is
hardly in a position to give any security
at all. Yet at the same time I think a
certain financial and political risk must be
run in this respect. After all. His Majesty’s
Government equally with ourselves have
one object in view—namely, the recovery,
if so it may be, of the independence and
integrity of Persia. It cannot be done
without money. I think, therefore, that
at the present stage we ought not to be
too exacting in our conditions. I believe
His Majesty’s Government along with
the Russian Government have recently
provided a loan to the Persian Government
in the form of* cash, and I think that
within the limits of such caution as they
find themselves able to observe something
further must be done in this direction. The
second point to which I wish to refer is that
of the gendarmerie. Let us by all means
give every encouragement we can to this
experiment of a gendarmerie under Swedish
officers. The noble Lord behind me paid
a tribute, which I was glad to hear, to
the spirit and patriotism of the men and
also to the hold that had already been
established over their confidence by their
officers. These officers, unfortunately, have
no executive authority. They are in
structors and little more. Still there is
in the creation of this gendarmerie the
germ of a good idea, and I hope His
Majesty’s Government will lend every
support to it in their power.
My observations have, I am afraid, been
of a somewhat depressing character, but we
shall do no good by shutting our eyes to
the fact that the position in Persia requires
unremitting vigilance. His Majesty’s
Government can do much more, I believe.