رسائل وأوراق بخصوص السكة الحديدية العابرة لبلاد فارس والسكك الحديدية الأخرى في بلاد فارس [و‎‎٢‎١‎١] (٤٤٢/٤٢١)

689
Persia.
Persia.
690
[ 24 July 1912]
military measures as it has taken in Persian terri
tory are of a purely provisional nature, and it has
no intention whatever of infringing the provisions
of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 as to
Persia.”
We were somewhat comforted by that
assurance, and I remember thanking the
noble Viscount for the definite advance
that seemed to have been made by this
announcement. We were told by Russia
that her military occupation was to be of
a purely provisional character. But now
what is the impression left upon us by the
picture drawn by the noble Lord ? Only
two days ago I read a reply given by the
Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons
to the effect that at the present moment
there are 12,400 Russian troops in the North
of Persia—an occupation more extensive
than has ever taken place before; an
occupation so definite that it quite justifies
the noble Lord in saying that practically
the whole of Northern Persia has passed
under the political control of Russia.
Tabriz in the North-west has long been a
town practically under Russian domination.
The same is now true of Meshed in the
North-east; and recently we heard that the
Russians had even bombarded the holy
shrine of Imam Reza at Meshed. It was
but yesterday I read that at Tabriz they
had ordered the Persian Government to
organise a further force of so-called Persian
Cossacks, which means, of course, Persian
troops under the charge of Russian officers
and non-commissioned officers and prac
tically obeying Russian commands. That,
then, is the position along the whole of the
North of Persia—a position of absolute
Russian supremacy, of Russian military
occupation very little short of annexation.
Then we come to the middle part of
Persia, the part in which lies the capital.
Here, again, I understood the noble
Marquess to dispute the general accuracy
of what my noble friend said. I believe
my noble friend was entirely justified. In
Teheran at the present moment the
Government is impotent. The Regent who
has been conducting affairs during the last
two years has, I believe, left the country ;
the Treasury is empty, and the control of
the finances, if the word is capable of being
used in connection with the present situation
in Persia, is in hands which are profoundly
distrusted both by the British and by the
Persians themselves, and which are believed
to be inspired by great sympathy with the
views of those extremists on the Russian
side to whom the noble Marquess referred.
I pass down to the South, towards the
sphere with which we are specially inter
ested. The noble Marquess deprecated the
use of the word “ anarchy ” as applied to
the condition of the trade roads in the
South of Persia. It is a curious thing that
only this morning I saw a letter from a
correspondent in Shiraz, written less than
three months ago, in which he used these
words—
“ The whole of Southern Persia is in a state of
anarchy and is ruled by robber gangs.”
That I believe to be a faithful description
of the fact. Trade is practically non
existent.
*The Marquess of CREWE : The noble
Earl scarcely caught what I said. My
intention was to point out that according
to Lord Lamington the only alternative was
either full military occupation or anarchy—
that there seemed to be no other course.
*Earl CURZON of KEDLESTON : I
do not for one moment think that that was
the alternative of my noble friend. But I
was alluding to the passage in the noble
Marquess’s speech in which he disputed
the accuracy of the use of the word
“ anarchy ” as applied to the conditions in
Southern Persia. I am afraid it is true.
Such is the position in that part of the
country with which we are chiefly con
cerned ; and the position, unhappily, has
been rendered not better but worse by the
very measures taken by His Majesty’s
Government to alleviate that state of
affairs—I allude to the despatch of
Indian Cavalry troops to Shiraz and
Isfahan. You have 240 troops at Shiraz
and 120 at Isfahan. Does not that quite
justify my noble friend in what he said
about this force being either too large or
too small for its object ?—too small to
control the roads, to protect travellers, to
dominate the tribes ; too large for the
mere purpose of a Consular escort. I
believe myself that the despatch of those
troops was a great mistake. It has caused
nothing but ill-feeling and heartburning in
Persia. So much so that the one traveller—
it used to be the other way about—who can
not now march up with any security from
the sea to the towns in the interior is an
Englishman. Surely that is a most pitiable
state of affairs. I hope that that mistake
having been recognised His Majesty’s
Government will, as soon as they can do
so with dignity and propriety, take these