رسائل وأوراق بخصوص السكة الحديدية العابرة لبلاد فارس والسكك الحديدية الأخرى في بلاد فارس [ظ‎‎٢‎٠‎٩] (٤٤٢/٤١٨)

683
Persia.
Persia.
684
[LORDS]
Governments there. The noble Lord, while
criticising the Convention, did not suggest—
and he was himself aware of the omission—
did not suggest any other method apart
from the Convention by which the integrity
of Persia can be altogether secured. He
said—I believe with perfect truth—that the
existence of the Convention was not incom
patible with that integrity. But he did not
say what I myself believe to be the fact,
that the existence of the Convention avoided
either the definite partition of Persia or at
any rate an occupation of a large part of
Persia by Russia, wdth a possible abstention
from any similar steps on our part in the
south, but with some strengthening, which
would clearly have been necessary in such
a case, of our position on the actual sea
board of the Persian Gulf. That is what I
cannot help believing would have been the
outcome if there had been no Entente
between us and Russia.
But the effect, according to the noble
Lord, either of too much interference or too
little has been equally disastrous. He
points to Northern Persia as being now in
Russian occupation, though I venture to
think that he has very greatly overstated
his case ; and he points to Southern Persia
as being in a condition, not of British
occupation, as we all know it is not, but of
complete and hopeless anarchy without a
trade road upon which it is possible for
any caravan to make a journey. That,
surely, places us in a somewhat melancholy
dilemma. Because it seems only reasonable
to assume that if Russia had for the time
being, or permanently, cleared altogether
out of Northern Persia a somewhat similar
state of anarchy would have reigned there,
or that the only method by which any
species of order could be secured in Southern
Persia would have been by a definite occu
pation by our troops. I should be very
sorry to believe that such a dilemma is the
one that we have to face, although I cer
tainly should not pretend to speak in any
thing like sanguine terms of the situation as
it exists at this moment or of the immediate
future.
The fact is, my Lords, I can think of no
comparison so accurate with the present
condition of Persia as that of the state in
which the noble Lord’s native land was in
the second half of the sixteenth century,
during the troublous reign of Mary Queen of
Scots and during the infancy of her son.
It would be possible to make a number of
close parallels between the condition of
The Marquess of Crewe.
things that obtained in Scotland at that
time and that of which one reads in Persia
now. We are confronted with this perpetual
difficulty, the question of money, which
appears to move in an eternal and vicious
circle in this way. Unless a considerable
amount of money is advanced to Persia
there is no chance of restoring order, but
unless order is restored you have no security
for the interest on the loan. It is possible,
therefore, to go on arguing backwards and
forwards on those two facts, each of them
indisputable in itself, with the natural
result that money appears to become more
and more difficult to lend. But it is only
just to say that the Russian Government
have fully recognised the paramount neces
sity of a loan, and, if possible, a large loan.
It may be necessary in the interval to go on
dribbling out smaller sums of money for the
meeting of immediate necessities, the pay of
the various forces involved, and so on, but
both countries will do their best by a close
examination of the real financial resources
of the country to see how the difficulty of
obtaining a reasonable security for the
interest of a large advance can be met.
Although, of course, their financial advisers
are bound to look at the matter from a
purely financial point of view, I am con
vinced that the Governments will be dis
posed not to take too hard or strict a view
in considering the possibility of an advance.
The noble Lord, in speaking of Southern
Persia, mentioned w T hat happened in the
autumn of last year, when we sent a larger
Consular escort to Shiraz, and the attack
on Mr. Smart, our Consul, took place on the
road from Bushire. The noble Lord
criticised the form of that Consular escort,
which he said was either too large or too
small. It was not large enough for an
army, and it was too large to be regarded as
a Consular guard. The noble Lord has
been in those parts and I have not, and
therefore I should be slow to contradict
him ; but I confess it is not easy to see,
the condition and position of Shiraz and of
our Consul there being what it is, why an
Indian Cavalry regiment should be regarded
as something so formidable or imposing that
it could not be looked upon as a Consular
guard. It might have been simpler, if the
noble Lord likes it it might have been
wiser, to send a battalion or half a battalion
of Infantry instead. The reason for sending
Cavalry was that at the time the life and
property of British subjects in Shiraz were
I considered to be in imminent danger.