رسائل وأوراق بخصوص السكة الحديدية العابرة لبلاد فارس والسكك الحديدية الأخرى في بلاد فارس [ظ‎‎٢‎٠‎٠] (٤٤٢/٤٠٠)

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The Trans-Persian Railway. [ LORDS ] The Trans-Persian Railway. 482
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naturally keen to see his hopes realised at
once. And in Karachi being made the
terminus of the Trans-Persian railway no
doubt Karachi would be very much uplifted.
But even the Chamber of Commerce realise
that there is a risk, and the Government
recognise the risk, because, as we under
stand from the papers, there has been an
obligation imposed by the Government and
admitted by the noble Viscount that the
alignment should, if required, be brought
down within reach of the coast with the
idea that our naval forces would be able to
command that line in case of any emergency.
I think that is a sufficient argument without
waiting for the utterances of the military
experts and others to show what a danger |
lies in this line when you propose to divert |
it in order to bring it within command of
your sea forces so as to prevent its being
used as a hostile instrument in the event
of invasion. First of all, it is very obvious
you would have to have a much stronger j
force than you have at the present time in
Indian waters if you wish to secure the line
by such means. But I am quite content |
merely to take that argument to show what
a great danger there is in having a line to j
India linked up with the outside world by
railway communication, and, as I say, the
conditions that rendered it undesirable in
the past still obtain at the present moment.
I am not one of those who wish to
represent that the utterances of the Press
are to be taken as indicating the views of the
whole of the nation. I would not for a
moment think that the carping criticisms
which are sometimes uttered in the Press of
this country against Germany indicate the
feelings of the people of this country against
the people of that nation. But there is one
very notable Russian journal, the Novoe \
Vremya, and that paper recently, just ;
previous to the interview at the Baltic port, '
published a very lengthy article with
reference to the relations of Germany and ;
Great Britain. Let me read two quotations. |
One is—
“ On the other hand, only the loss of India by
England, from whatever cause, would establish
permanent peace between us and her.”
Then it goes on—
“Russia ought to rejoice that somebody has
arisen to fight the enemy who for a hundred years
stood in her way everywhere. Is it not England’s
hegemony at sea which has compelled us to stop
dead, as before a stone wall, in all the Easts—the
Near, the Middle, and the Far East? Is it not
this hegemony which will keep us back in our
natural evolution on two continents in the future ?”
Lord Lamington.
I associate myself entirely with the words
spoken by the noble Earl as to the value
of the friendly relations subsisting between
us and Russia, but we only have to look
back to our foreign relations during the last
twenty years with the different Powers of
the world to see how shifting and how
variable these relations are ; and really the
sole excuse for the putting forward of this
scheme at the present time is our Entente
with Russia. All the other objections
remain exactly as they have been for the
last fifty or a hundred years, and whilst we
earnestly hope that the Entente may be
continued for many long years to come
we ought not to consent to the con
struction of a permanent work of such a
character as a railway line on such a very
shifting foundation or base as that which
I have described. I do not think the
noble Viscount vouchsafed any reply as
to our having the opinion of the military
experts and as to putting ourselves into
the position that this country was in when
a Committee reported on the project of the
proposed Channel Tunnel. Surely we ought
to have the views of the Council of Defence
on this matter. We ought also to know
whether the Board of Trade have considered
the commercial advantages of this line. I
think we are entitled to have put before
Parliament the views of these different
bodies. I think it is admitted that there
is practically no commercial advantage in
this line to India—nothing that will pay
a half per cent, on capital; and you have
this very great risk and also the great
expenditure the Government would have
to incur by giving a guarantee.
I am surprised to find that the noble
Viscount has been bold enough to stand up
and make an apology for this project.
He has refused on two or three occasions
to consider a poor little railway in the
Aden Hinterland, a railway which would
open up the fertile country around and
give relief to your sun-baked garrison
at Aden by letting them get to a hill
station, and which would not cost your
Government a single rupee. Lord Morley
when the autocratic Secretary of State
for India would have nothing to do
with that small project; yet here the
noble Viscount ventures to defend a
project of great risk without any possible
advantage to India and with only a
minimum of advantage to Persia. The
noble Viscount, in his reply, dilated upon
the benefit to Persia of improved com-