رسائل وأوراق بخصوص السكة الحديدية العابرة لبلاد فارس والسكك الحديدية الأخرى في بلاد فارس [و‎‎١‎٩‎٥] (٤٤٢/٣٨٩)

459 The Trans-Persian Railway. [15 July 1912] The Trans-Persian Railway. 460
say this, that whether it be right or whether
it be wrong it involves a more fundamental
change in British policy towards India and
the defence of India than any event that
has taken place in the history of India since
the days of Lord Clive.
In these circumstances I think your Lord - 1
ships will agree that it behoves this House
to look rather seriously into the grounds for
this great departure, and to inquire what is
the attitude of those who are really best
qualified to advise about it. As regards the
grounds, Sir Edward Grey, in the speech to
which I referred, only found time for one,
and that was the argument of inevitability.
He said this railway must come ; it is sure
to be made sooner or later, and therefore
we had better join.. I should like to make
these observations upon the argument of
inevitability. If I were asked for my
private opinion, I think I would truthfully
say that some day or other the overland
connection with India will come. I do not
say that it will come now or in ten years or
in twenty years, but I think some day it
will come. But because you may look upon
it from that point of view, because you may
regard it as inevitable to that extent, it does
not follow that the railway ought to be
made now. It does not follow that because
it is inevitable to that extent it will be good
for us or good for India. It does not follow
that because it is inevitable we ought to take
an active part in joining at the present
stage. In fact, it does not follow in the
least that because it is some day certain to
be made this Government or any British
Government ought to be favourable to the
scheme. There are, for instance, other
ways to approach India overland which
have met with favour in some quarters.
The shortest overland route to India is
through the Russian territories of Trans-
Caspia and through Afghanistan. I think
that less than 500 miles intervene wdiich are
not now covered by rails. There are many
people who think that that is the line by
wdnch Europe ought to be united to Asia.
The arguments for that line are just as
strong or just as weak, whichever way you
like to put it, as those for the Trans-
Persian line. The argument of inevitability
applies equally to that line with the other.
Yet no British Government has brought
forward a concrete proposal for such a line,
because we know that the Ameer of Afghan
istan, as was his predecessor, is inflexibly
opposed to it. There is another scheme—
that of running a railway from Egypt via
Port Said across the Peninsula of Sinai and
then across Arabia to the Persian Gulf. I
make this observation to show that there is
nothing in the argument of inevitability, for
w r hat it is worth, which applies particularly
to the Trans-Persian scheme.
Upon this question of inevitability may
I recall to your Lordships a memory which
is probably fairly fresh in the minds of
many of you—I mean the construction of
the Channel Tunnel. How easily it used
to be shown in the House of Commons
that the Channel is an artificial and
superannuated obstacle which ought not
to be allowed to continue, in so far as the
action of man could counteract it, in view
of the wider and more cosmopolitan ideas
of modern days. When first I entered the
House of Commons I was rather affected
by those view r s myself, and I fancy I
gave a foolish vote in favour of .the con
struction of the Channel Tunnel. But as
soon as the military authorities had been
heard on the matter, and when they
demonstrated, as they did, that the Channel
Tunnel would make England not safe, that
it really would amount to a sacrifice of the
incomparable frontier presented to us by
nature, and that this little tube running
under the sea, instead of merely being an
instrument of amity and of commerce,
might become an engine of invasion and
destruction, from that moment public
opinion changed and the Channel Tunnel
scheme was overwhelmed with complete
annihilation, an annihilation from which
our friendly regard for France was not able
to rescue it. And yet precisely the same
reasoning was used about the inevitability
of the Channel Tunnel. Therefore I am
not impressed in the least degree by that
argument.
I venture to say that the decision of a
great issue of this sort ought not to be
made on a 'priori grounds, nor on the
fatalistic principle of accepting what will one
day come. The sole test is whether the rail
way will be for the advantage of England.
India, and Persia. Is this railway wanted
for any of those three parties ? Will it do
good to any of them ? Will it materially
improve their security, their peace, their
prosperity ? If so, let us go ahead with the
railway. * If not, let us desist. If you look
at the matter from this point of view I
think you cannot fail to be impressed by
the attitude so far taken up by those who
may fairly be called experts on the matter.
I have only myself met one man who can