رسائل وأوراق بخصوص السكة الحديدية العابرة لبلاد فارس والسكك الحديدية الأخرى في بلاد فارس [و‎‎١‎٠‎٨] (٤٤٢/٢١٥)

14.
Koh-I-Hal±k Siah, skirting the Northern limit e of the
Koh-I~Sulten mountains end the foot of the lonft steep slope
which springs from the base of the wed^e shaped hills, kncvm &8
the Kaoha-Saindak-Amalaf ranrre.
At the close of the last Afghan war, the boundary whioh
separated Daluohistmi Vrotn Afghanistan left the whole of the
Nushki Beglatan, the Chafrai Sarlat hills, and the Southern banl:
of the river Helmand, in Western damsel, without Afghanistan.
This boundary, although t rib ally oorreot, was somewhat indetemdnate
as the influenoe whioh the Brahui Khans of Kalat possessed in
Nushki and over its outlying pastoral tribes was subject to
considerable fluctuations and wa s no t infrequently disregarded.
The Khar an Sardar^would never accept Kalat authority and such
attempts as had, from time to time, been made by the Khan to
enforce it had failed. Although the sympathies of the Chagai and
Western damsel Sardars lay rather with Kalat than with Afghanistan,
yet out off as they were from Kalat by Xharan, their intercourse
had always lain with the heeds of their tribes in Seistan, rather
than with Kalat. In short, like Khar an, they claimed to be
Baluchistan Sardars, under British protection. The late Anir of
Afghanistan, with the sagacity and'prescience whioh were always
characteristic of that remarkable man, was not slow to grasp the
great military importance of the position Chagai fort and the
Chagai hills occupied, in relation to the Helmand valley and
Southern Afghanistan. By recourse to force of arms, he took
possession of Western Garmsel and, using this as a base, he
manipulated matters in such a way that on the first favourable
opportunity offering, he seized Chagai Fort. While the Baluoh-Afghan
delimitation ccamaission of 1896 resulted in his withdrawal from
Chagai fort, yet he retained possession of Western Gartnsel, as
well as of an important foothold in the Chagai Sarlat hills. There
were, at the time, obvious difficulties in pressing the Afghans baok
to their traditional frontier line, yet in view of the clearness
of our case, the protest we had entered at the time of the wholly
f o