"سكة حديد بغداد" [ظ‎‎١‎٦] (١٢٩/٣٢)

8
(E.), App.
* t 0O)
(E ), pp. 72, 80.
(F.), P- 5.
(A.), p. 21.
9 -
*
that thtT6 appears no reason why the Tigris should not be made navigable from Mosul
southwards (the current is the only difficulty and it is not to be compared in rapidity
with the Upper Yang*tsze\ and that the Arab population is practically*bomogeneous
with that below Bagdad. It would also obviate any danger of competition between
rail and water transport, as both would be in our hands. Somewhat similar condi
tions prevail in Burmah, where the Irrawadi River and the Rangoon Railway run
side by side, and it is understood that the natives on the whole prefer the former
means of forwarding goods not because of cheaper rates but because of the con option
almost invariably incident to Oriental railway systems.
37. Nothing has been said of the Bagdad-Khanikin branch (100 miles). In
the opinion of the present writer, who has travelled over the road, it can be ot little
use unless it is to connect with a through line by Hamadan to 1 eh ran which, under
the present circumstances appear highly improbable. I he country through winch it
passes is lov r lying and often inundated, the villages are few and wretched, and bulk
would in any case have to be broken at the frontier station when mule o. camel
transport would be resorted to. Were it built, how r ever, its total cost should not exceed
6,000/. a-mile, say 600,000/. in all.
38. As regards Mosul, Bagdad, Kerbela, and Bussorah, the tour chief cities through
which the main line from Bagdad to the Persian Gulf would pass, they contain a
population betw een them of 500,000 souls. There is no doubt tuat in the neignbour-
hood of the line and of the two rivers there is naphtha and coal, and the date
and cereal production, at present of considerable size, is certainly capable of great
expansion. To a large extent the future commercial prospects are no doubt dependent
on the irrigation question, statistics oi which in this paper could only be conjecture,
but even under existing conditions with better transport facilities the land would
almost necessarily become much more remunerative than it is at present. (Cf. para
graph 7.) Bagdad is a large market and the chief trade centre of this part of Western
Asia, and at Bussorah there are nearly always three to four mouths arrears of cargo
waiting to go up the river. Labour, though scarce, is not dear, while the half
sedentary, half nomad population of the valleys is of a type that soon becomes
amenable to enlightened rule. Although the country is not fitted for European
colonization (which indeed the present Sultan would never allow, though the suggested
Secret Convention against it has been denied by Mr. Gwinner), there is no reason why
the Circassian element should not be introduced as beneficially into Mesopotamia as it
has been into Zor, Syria, and the Hauran.
39. Summarizing the above arguments, the following are the conclusions
arrived at:—
(a.) That the Germans are determined to build the Bagdad line somehow, and
that it appears reasonably probable that they may succeed in doing so without our
participation.
(h.) That if it is built without our participation our general position in this part
of Western Asia in the future will be worse than it is now.
(c.) That we are not likely to get a better opportunity for negotiation than the
present.
(d.) That we should therefore participate if the Germans will admit us, and if we
can secure for ourselves the Bagdad-Bersian Gulf section, the navigation of the Lower
Tigris, ard equal commercial treatment.