"سكة حديد بغداد" [و‎‎١‎٦] (١٢٩/٣١)

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a similar advantage being denied to us, our position, even if it included the entire
control of the railway and a share of the navigation Df the river below Bagdad, might
become quite ineffective.
28. There will in any case have to be a considerable reduction of freights on the
river (they reach at present as high as 37* a ton up and 22s. down, the up and down
average oil all steamers being about 24s.). This, of course, means smaller profits.
Under these circumstances there seems to be no reason why we should not negotiate,
through Messrs. Lynch or directly, to take over the Sultan’s service or to work it for
him on an arrangement, receiving a promise in return for protection from future
competition. This should also apply to any future navigation that might be under
taken on the Lower Euphrates.
29. A further condition, or one subsidiary to Sir G. Clarke’s (3) should preclude
the imposition of differential rates of any kind against British goods, either in transit
or otherwise, and whether by any transport or storing agency or, in possible even
tualities, by the Customs
30. To obtain these conditions we might as a first proposal offer to construct with
British capital the Bagdad-Persian Gulf section—the line to be always and entirely
British, the waterways monopoly or something akin to it, and all the subsidiary rights
of the concessionnaire as to factories, warehouses, &c., alluded to above, being granted
to us in return. Article XXIX of the Convention would also have to be so modified
as to give us the right of working this section as soon as it was completed.
This portion of the line is roughly about 440 miles long, and at 7,000/. a mile
(some embankments would be needed which might involve a little expense) should
bring the cost to 3,000,000/. That is to say, we should be building about one-third
of the total line at one-fifth of the total cost. We could adduce as a further
argument the large sums we should eventually have to spend in irrigation.
1,500,000/., according to Dr. Rohrbach, would do a great deal as a first instalment.
31. It is doubtful, however, whether the Germans would accept such terms. If
they refused we might as a second proposal supplement the above by oflering in
addition to build the extra 230 miles between Bagdad and Mosul, which should cost
another 2,000,000/. This would mean that we were building half the entire line at
about one-third of the entire cost. We should again have to insist on the control of
the waterway, but might, if pressed, waive the exclusive British control for the Mosul-
Bagdad portion of the railroad.
32. We could at the same time agree to the Anatolian Railway becoming an
exclusively German line, in the same way that the Bagdad-Persian Gulf section
became exclusively British—though this seems rather like offering to give the
Germans something which belongs to the Sultan, over which even in theory we Imve
no power, and which they already possess in fact.
33. If none of these terms were sufficiently tempting to the Germans we
might, if the financial houses concerned were inclined to do so. go as far as oflering
to provide half the total cost of construction (7.500,000/.) of which the 5,000,000/.
mentioned above would build the Mosul-Persian Gulf sections, to be under exclusively
British control, while the remainder would go towards the construction of the rest of
the line—the control of the waterways and the various contingent rights on our
sections remaining as before in our hands. Lord Kevelstoke, 8ir C. Dawkins and
Sir E. Cassel, from their correspondence with Lord Lansdowne in 1903, evidently
contemplated floating a loan of this magnitude under certain eventualities, and it the
terms met with the approval of His Majesty’s Government.
34. It will thus be seen that great importance is attached: (1) to the extreme
easterly portion of the line; and (2) to the navigation rights on the Tigris (and also on
the Euphrates) being in British hands. Xo modification of these two conditions
could be made without the danger of eventually converting us into mere shareholders
in an ordinary German financial undertaking. The political and commercial
advantages might then become quite out of proportion to the amount of capital
involved, and might conceivablv be found to be entirely illusory.
35. Should third parties, the French, Swiss or others be introduced, and especially
the Turkish Government, the Deutsche Bank, &c., the greatest circumspection would
be necessary to insure no possible combination which might be to our detriment
—but in any case matters should be so arranged that the Bagdad-Persian Gulf section
should remain in our exclusive control.
36. The suggestion of our interesting ourselves as far north as Mosul is, it is
believed, new. In its favour there is the fact that most of the country north of
Bagdad (of Tekrit actually; is watered by rainfall and does not need irrigation,
[2062 2 —1J D
(G.)> P. 59.
(A.), p
(A.), passim .