"سكة حديد بغداد" [ظ‎‎١‎٥] (١٢٩/٣٠)

(F.),p.5.
(C.), p. 5.
(E.). App. (C.)
6
Dr. Rohrbach’s records of an annual output of 10 , 000,000 tons of corn in the sixth
century a.d., and of a population of 0,000,000 souls 300 years later, and without
basin o' too much on Sir W. Willcock’s forecasts of immense future developments, we
may safely assume that the lower valleys ol the ligris and Euphrates are quite
capable, if properly irrigated, ot exporting cereals to a large amount.
The country between Aleppo and Mosul, and even as far south as let ;fc, is
sufficiently watered by the rainfall—but below that point irrigation becomes a
necessity, and to make this portion of the line pay well, there is little doubt that
money would have to be sunk in restoring the old canals and building new ones.
To estimate the amount needed, the work to be done, and the time and ra es of
return, could only be done by disinterested experts, and even then to a great extent
must be conjecture.
It would be safer and more economical in every way only to undertake such works
when the line was well advanced, and when every opportunity had been taken for
studying the question in all its aspects.
The population in some of these regions is extremely sparse, in parts only six or
seven per square mile, and though labour is cheap and mobile, it would appear to be
unwise to embark capital in such an enterprise except gradually.
21. On the railway itself, therefore, it appears that we are unlikely to lose, except
for the working expenses of the first few years, and to a comparatively slight amount.
The remaining prospects appear to promise us commercial advantages. The more
proximate of these advantages are of a negative order, i.e.. the avoidance of the loss
of our trade as against the Germans, and the maintenance of oar position as carriers
on the Tigris. But in the future, and in return for the investment of capit ii, there
are possibilities which may reasonably be considered as very great.
22. It accordingly seems clear that, under the circumstances, and considering
especially the present position of the Germans at Constantinople and of their railway
in Anatolia, the balance of advantage to us on all grounds would be to participate with
them if we can secure sufficiently favourable terms.
23. The final point for consideration is, therefore, what are the sufficiently
favourable terms.
24. It is presumed that a condition to negotiation is that we should be given, in
so far as we participate, as controlling a position as that of the Germans. This was
the rock upon which the pourparlers of 1903 split, and it is likely to be the difficulty
again now. It w T ould be unwise to assume that the Germans are more anxious to meet
us now than they were two years ago We should therefore prepare our proposals
with a view r to having to reduce them.
25. The portion of the line in which we are most interested in every way is that
between Bagdad and the Persian Gulf.
26. The conditions which Sir G. Clarke lays down as necessary to British interests
are :—
(1.) The construction of the Bagdad-Persian Gulf section of the line, together
with the contemplated branch from Bagdad to the Persian frontier, by British capital
and under British direction.
(2.) The retention of this section under British management.
(3.) Pooling the general traffic under a working arrangement, giving Great Britain
adequate representation on the directorate.
(This appears to include “ equal rates for British goods.”)
27. But it is no less necessary that we should keep the waterways as well as the
railroad in our own hands if either are to be of any real value. Without labouring the
point, it seems obvious that unless we had a guarantee the Sultan’s steamers on
the Tigris could at any time undercut our freight rates, and even with a guarantee it
would be difficult to compete with down-stream rates that are sometimes even now
as low 7 as \d. per ton per mile.f The low r est freight rates on the Anatolian Bail way
1902-1903 averaged fd. per ton per mile. There appears also to be no real reason
why the river service should not be extended as far north as Mosul. A steamer
ascended in 1837 to Nimrud, a few miles south of Mosul, and the river throughout its
lower course seems to be capable of sufficient improvement to make this generally
feasible. Should the Sultan or the Germans put steamers on the Tigris above BagdadT
* This question is examined in detail by Willcocks and touched on by Rohrbach. Appendix (A) gives a
short summary of Willcocks’ principal statistics.
f Down-stream rates (Bagdad to Bussorah), are as low as Is. 6eZ. a ton in winter months.