أوراق المؤتمر بين الإدارات حول شؤون الشرق الأوسط [و‎‎١‎٣‎٩] (٢٩٠/٢٧٧)

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Conference had now to consider the later telegrams from Baghdad.
Of these the most important was telegram No. 6948 of the 9th June,
in which Colonel Wilson spoke of the general political unrest in
Mesopotamia and of the weakness of our forces in that country.
He expressed the opinion that effect could not be given to the
mandate without risk of disaster, unless His Majesty’s Government
were prepared to maintain for the next two years at least as many
troops in that country as they now had. He talked of regaining
possession of Dar-as-Zor up to Rakka inclusive, and considered that
unless this town were included in Mesopotanra we should have to
keep more and not less troops than we n nv had. He proceeded to
make a series of astounding statements in paragraph IX of his
telegram, where he said that we could not m-untain our position as
mandatory by a policy of conciliating extremists, and that we must
be prepared, regardless of the League of Nations, to go very slowly
with constitutional and democratic institutions, the application of
which to Eastern countries had been attempted of late years with
so small a degree of success. He concluded by saying that there
were only two alternatives: either to follow the policy outlined bv
himself, or to evacuate Mesopotamia. He appeared to be prepared
himself to adopt and carry out either of these two contradictory
policies. in a later telegram, despatched on the same day,
No. 6976, Colonel Wilson suggested the despatch to England of
a deputation of eight persons, who would no doubt be carefully
selected by himself. In an earlier telegram, No. 6791 of the
7th June, he suggested that Sir Percy Cox should be smuggled
incognito through Mesopotamia, and that no good purpose would be
served by his seeing the extremists in Baghdad.
He could onlv sav that these telegrams left him with an
unpleasant impression of Colonel Wilson’s incapacity to deal with
the situation. He must ask the Secretary of State for India to say
whether he considered that the policy on which they were in perfect
agreement, and which they would have to defend against a powerful
attack in the Cabinet on the following day, was likely to be carried
into effect so long as Sir Arnold Wilson remained in political control
in Mesopotamia.
Mr. Montagu prefaced his remarks by informing the Conference
that he had circulated to the Cabinet the two Baghdad telegrams of
the 9th June. He reminded them that the announcement authorised
in India Office telegrams of the 7th June had not been considered
by the Cabinet, and in view of the larger questions raised in these
telegrams, which could only be decided by the Cabinec, he had
thought it his duty to place them in possession of Colonel
Wilson’s views, though he was quite prepared to express his own
disagreement with them. He wished also to mention the further
point that it had been hoped that Colonel Wilson’s hands would
have been strengthened by the India Office telegrams of the 7th June,
but that Colonel Wilson did not seem to be of this opinion. He had
not been able to consult the Chairman on the previous day, and, as
the matter appeared to him of great urgency, he had telegraphed to
Sir Arnold Wilson, informing him that in view of his very grave
telegrams the publication of the announcement should for the present
be postponed. As he understood that Sir Percy Cox was expected
to arrive in Baghdad on the 18th June, he had also directed that
he should be consulted.
Referring to the Chairman’s question, he said that he had never
held the view that Colonel Wilson, with his marked inclination to
concentrate power in his own hands, could fairly be asked to carry
out the policy of His Majesty’s Government in Mesopotamia. He
could not, however, come to England until Sir Percy Cox had taken
over, as there was no one to take his place. He had consulted
Colonel Wilson privately on this point, and had received a reply to
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