أوراق المؤتمر بين الإدارات حول شؤون الشرق الأوسط [و‎‎١‎٢‎٩] (٢٩٠/٢٥٧)

3
provided that the War Office were not in a position to reinforce
Tabriz. There was one other small point to be considered, namely,
the repatriation of the refugees at Enzeli and the disposal of the
volunteer fleet.
Developments in Persia brought the Bolshevik problem in
Persia before us in rather an acute form. His own opinion was that it
should be dealt with as a whole. On that very day a Bolshevik
deputation had arrived in London for the purpose of discussing the
possibility of reopening economic relations with Prussia. Krassin,
who was to have headed this deputation, had not accompanied it,
and the participation of Litvinof had not been accepted by His
Majesty’s Government for reasons which were well known to the
Conference. Every effort had been made to induce Krassin himself
to come. He was an able man, and as a commissary would have
more authority than the remaining members of the deputation. He
presumed that until Krassin’s presence was secured preliminary
negotiations would be opened with the deputation. If Krassin
himself appeared he would be inclined to say co him that neither the
Bolsheviks nor His Majesty’s Government could ride two horses.
The Soviet Government were in a precarious state and very anxious
to secure our assistance in restoring their economic position. The
stories of unlimited resources available in Bussia were, he thought,
very much exaggerated, yet at the very same time that they were
appealing to us to assist them economically they were engaged in
definitely anti-British activities at Merv, Tashkent, Askabad,
and in North-West Persia. It seemed to him ridiculous that
we should carets these men here while out there the Government
which they represented was leaving no stone unturned to destroy
our Indian Empire and our whole position in the East.
When considering the Persian situation, the Conference must
bear these facts in mind and realise that we had something in hand,
and that running away was not the only possible alternative. It
was difficult for us to say which of us was bluffing the most in
North-We-t Persia. The questions raised in the General Staff
memorandum were primarily military, but had also a political aspect.
He had just received a private telegram from Sir Percy Cox
reporting that the foreign editor of the “Times” had despatched a
message to his correspondent at Teheran, in which he alleged that the
Anglo-Persian Agreement had not been concurred in by the
Government of India, that it was made solely with three Anglophile
Persian Ministers, and that it was to all intents and purposes a dead
letter. This was, in his opinion, a most mischievous communication,
and of course totally inaccurate. The Secretary of State for India
would benr him out in contradicting the first allegation. As to the
second, he had always been in favour of summoning the Medjliss and
laying the agreement before them. The Ministers with whom it
was concluded had been quite ready to do the same. It was Firuz
Mirza who had hesitated to take this course. His own reasons for
recommending it had been : firstly, that he was anxious to lay the
agreement as soon as possible before the League of Nations; and
secondly, that he could not imagine any Persian Medjliss declining to
accept an agreement which was so fair and reasonable, and which
secured such undoubted advantages to the Persian Government.
General Radcliffe said that the position of the General Staff'
and the War Office generally was very difficult. They were being
continually pulled both ways. On the one hand, Sir Percy Cox
was Dressing them to retain their scattered and outlying garrisons
in Persia; on the other hand, the Treasury was insisting that
expenditure should be cut down. They were not really free agents
in the matter, but in the case of the Tabriz detachment military
considerations appeared to them to outweigh all others. The
detachment had originally been stranded at Tabriz by mistake,
having missed the last train to Batoum. It was 250 miles away
from its supports, and was simultaneously threatened from Astara
[3268] B 2