أوراق المؤتمر بين الإدارات حول شؤون الشرق الأوسط [و‎‎١‎٢‎٤] (٢٩٠/٢٤٧)

the small detachments now In Kurdistan. It was anticipated that
the Air Force would be in a position to take over in about twelve
months—at any rate to some extent. It would be much easier for
them to take over a going concern than to restore order after the
chaos which would certainly ensue on our withdrawal.
Mr. Montagu thought that we ought to establish precisely
similar conditions in Southern Kurdistan and in Mesopotamia. It
was true that if the Chaldeans were to be repatriated to the area
now proposed by Colonel Wilson, it would be difficult to explain
our continued connection with Southern Kurdistan as being necessi
tated by their repatriation. But could we not explain it by saying
that Southern Kurdistan was always part of Mesopotamia under the
Turks?
Mr. Garbett, replying to questions by the Chairman, said that it
was not considered possible to repatriate the Assyrians within the
limits of the old Mosul vilayet. Fie did not think that there was any
Kurdish autonomy party which did not contemplate some suzerainty,
either British or French, or even Turkish.
The Chairman said that the Conference appeared to be swinging
round to the idea of leaving the Kurds of Northern Kurdistan under
the Turks. Apart from the objections which he had already offered
to this course, there was the strong argument that we did not wish
Turkey to be left in a powerful position against Armenia, the
Peace Conference had been contemplating the expulsion of the Turks
from Erzerum, where they would otherwise be in a position to
threaten the new Armenia. The effect of this would be to a large
extent stultified if we allowed the Turks to occupy the country
running along the southern frontier of Armenia to the Persian
frontier.
Mr. Montagu hoped that he was not misunderstood. He would
prefer an independent Kuidistan if this could be arranged. He
suggested that the way to do this would be to make a treaty which
some party in Turkey could sign without compulsion, in which case
they might give up Kurdistan willingly.
The Chairman suggested that the Conference should now
consider Mesopotamia, and return to the question of Kurdistan
later. The Mesopotamian case was scarcely less difficult than that
of Kurdistan. There had been two schools of thought all the way
through, the first, of which Colonel Wilson was the most notable
exponent, was the school of direct British administration. The
second, with which Miss Bed had associated herself, was the Native
State School. Colonel Wilson, being a man of great energy and
power, had, in virtue of his official position, succeeded in bringing his
view into force, and His Majesty’s Covernment had been more or less
obliged to acquiesce. Latterly, however, there had been a change,
due partly to recent developments in the Arab countries and partly
to the pressure which we had been endeavouring to exercise from
here. Colonel Wilson himself had changed his views, though he could
hardly be described as penitent. He was so much attached to the
country that he would prefer to stay there even to carry out a policy
with which he had not hitherto agreed.
At this stage the Damascus Congress appeared upon this
troubled scene. The action taken at Damascus had two aspects—
the Syrian and the Mesopotamian. With the Syrian aspect the
Conference had not at present to deal.
As regards the Mesopotamian aspect, it was, of course, easy to
ridicule, as Colonel Wilson did, the action of the twenty-nine
Mesopotamians in Damascus. Personally, he thought Colonel Wilson
was wrong. What had the twenty-nine done ? They had proclaimed
Abdulla King of Mesopotamia with Zeid as Ilegent. Zeid was a
young man in the early twenties, whose chief desire was apparently
to be educated at an English university. His regency need not-be