أوراق المؤتمر بين الإدارات حول شؤون الشرق الأوسط [و‎‎١‎٢‎٣] (٢٩٠/٢٤٥)

Mr. Montagu said that the India Office had arrived at a solution
comparable to that proposed by the Chairman. They thought
that anything would be preferable to the establishment of an
independent frontier district of Mesopotamia on the lines of the
North-West Province of India. They were also alarmed at the
report of the Inter-Allied Military Commission. They desired a
distinction to be*drawn between Southern and Northern Kurdistan.
He was aware that this was contrary to the opinions that they had
expressed before, and it was also flying in the face of the opinion of
Major Noel, but they did not now wish Southern Kurdistan to form part
of Mesopotamia. They wished it to be an independent State, having
its own revenues and a separate administration. Hope might be
held out to it that it should join Northern Kurdistan at some future
date. He did not think this policy would necessitate a larger
garrison in Southern Kurdistan. The force there now was very
small and mi^ht even be reduced.
There was another important point which had to be considered,
namely, the future of the Chaldeans.
The Chaldean refugees were at present causing considerable
expense to His Majesty’s Government, and it was clearly desirable
that the refugee camp at Baqubah should be broken up as soon as
possible. The Chaldeans declined to be repatriated to any area
where there was a fear that they would be under Turkish rule.
Colonel Wilson’s new suggestion was that they should be settled
in an area wdiich lay astride the Persian frontier. He under
stood that there was some question of the Persian frontier being
rectified in favour of the Persian Government. If it could be
extended to include the whole of this area, the Chaldeans would no
longer be under Turkish rule.
The Chairman said that one of the chief objections to the
establishment of a quasi-autonomous Kurdish State with British
advisers was that the French might be tempted to establish a similar
State with French advisers' in Northern Kurdistan. It was true
that the French had been disillusioned as to their prospects in Cilicia,
but they had consistently aimed at extending their influence to the
East and absorbing Western Kurdistan. He had been doing his
best to fend M. Berthelot off this area, and the argument that he had
employed was that we were ourselves proposing to clear out of
Southern Kurdistan. He feared that we would awaken opposition
if we now went to San Remo and said that we had abandoned this
intention.
As to the Chaldeans, we were all anxious to repatriate them, but
what did rectification of the Persian frontier mean ? It was surelv
not suggested that this rectification should be carried out as between
the Turkish and Persian Governments. The only people with whom
the Persian Government could discuss their Kurdistan frontier were
the Kurds themselves. It was true that there was at present no
representative Kurdish body with whom they could negotiate, nor was
it quite clear at what stage the negotiations could be commenced, but
he had always told the Persian Minister when he brought up the
question that they must negotiate later with the Kurds. He
thought it would be highly objectionable for the Persians now to be
told that they must negotiate with the Turks.
Mr. Montagu questioned the desirability of our taking up the
attitude that the Turks should be left only in those portions of
Kurdistan in which we were not ourselves interested.
The Chairman pointed out that, on the other hand, it would
have a deplorable effect if we left the Turks in the whole of
Northern Kurdistan merely in order to facilitate the repatriation
of the Chaldeans. This would be a very big price to pay and
would, moreover, be quite contrary to what we had been saying to
the French. The talented lady who had come to London to
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