أوراق المؤتمر بين الإدارات حول شؤون الشرق الأوسط [ظ‎‎١‎٢‎٢] (٢٩٠/٢٤٤)

4
troubles. When we had originally despatched a force to Basrah, we
had had no intention of holding Mesopotamia permanently. We had
been gradually drawn on to Baghdad and to the mountain districts
which lay between Baghdad and Mosul and the Persian frontier.
The Cabinet were anxious to reduce the financial and military
commitments of His Majesty’s Government as far as possible.
As far as Kurdistan was concerned, his solution had been that
we should disassociate ourselves altogether from that country.
The India Office, on the other hand, had recommended a
modified connection with Southern Kurdistan. He asked
whether, in the event of the large majority of Mesopo
tamians in the northern parts of Mesopotamia asking for Abdulla
to rule over them, and of the people of Southern Kurdistan
also accepting his suzerainty, w T e should do wisely to reject this
possibility. Over a year ago the people of Mesopotamia had been
invited to express their opinions. He did not wish to hint that, the
reply that they had given did not accurately represent the feelings at
that time. But there were people who knew the country well, Miss
Bell among others, who were of opinion that they w r ould now accept
Abdulla.
Sir Arthur Hirtzel said that though Miss Bell favoured an Arab
Amir for Mesopotamia, he did not think she recommended Abdulla
for this post.
Mr. Shuckhurgh thought that it was Colonel Lawrence who
had supported the idea of Abdulla going to Mesopotamia.
Mr. Montagu remarked that in any discussion on the future of
Kurdistan it was essential to decide how the Turk was going to be
. turned out. It was difficult to treat the Treaty wdth Turkey piece
meal, as each part had a bearing on the others. He had not been
consulted by the Foreign Office as regards other parts of the Treaty,
but he understood that military measures would be necessary for its
enforcement. An Int^r-Allied Commission under the presidency of
Marshal Foch had been considering this question in Paris. It was,
he thought, logical to assume that the force necessary would increase
in proportion to the area out of which the Turk v'as to be driven.
The Chairman agreed that this question must be considered.
He had discussed it wuth Mr. Vansittart, who had submitted two draft
clauses relating to Kurdistan for insertion in the Treaty of Peace
(Appendix (A)).
He objected to the first of these clauses for two reasons : firstly,
the mention in it of the League of Nations, w'ho were, he thought,
unlikely to accept any responsibility for the future of Kurdistan ;
and secondly, the recognition in it of the position of the Turkish
Government. He was inclined to think that the second clause, or
something similar to it, might provide an answer to Mr. Montagu’s
. question. It did not sever Kurdistan from Turkey straight off," but
left the problem to be solved in the course of the next year.
Sir Arthur tlirtzel asked whether in the meanwhile the Kurdish
people would remain under Turkish administration. This was the
position now, except, of course, in Southern Kurdistan.
The Chairman said that if His Majesty’s Government were to
retain any form of connection with Southern Kurdistan he should
prefer the request to come from the people themselves. It uas time
that we should take a step forward and consult either the Councils
or the leading notables. Something must be done to stop the
process of crystallization to which Colonel W ilson referred. A ccording
to him the report that we were likely to. evacuate had resulted in a
general panic, and everyone had lushed in to protest. This beiim
so, we need not fear an unfavourable decision on the part of the
people if they were given an opportunity of expressing their views.