أوراق المؤتمر بين الإدارات حول شؤون الشرق الأوسط [و‎‎١‎٠‎٨] (٢٩٠/٢١٥)

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War Office essential to the retention of either of these two lines,
such a force would be better employed, not by spreading it out
across the north of Persia, hut by a direct attack on Moscow through
Poland. This would have the effect of animating every other anti-
Bolshevik force on all the Russian frontiers. At the same time it
was considered that as long as there was a chance of Denikin’s
recovering and of the Caucasian Republics co-operating with him in
resisting the common enemy, such a measure of support should be
given them as to lessen the possibility of their assisting the Bolsheviks
by menacing his rear. With this end in view, a small part of
Denikin’s “packet ” might be transferred to the Caucasian Republics
at the discretion of the War Office. If Denikin were to collapse
altogether, it was not worth while to send his “ packet ” to the
Republics who would join the Bolsheviks and use it against us, but
a small part of it might be diverted now, really to help Denikin.
With regard to the Caspian fleet, the return of British naval
personnel would only be possible in the event of the adoption of
alternatives (a) or (b). If this could not be done it was not con
sidered practicable to invite Denikin to destroy it.
In reply to query No. 6 of Lord Curzon’s telegram, he suggested
that the Conference should reply that unless alternatives (a) or (b)
were to he adopted the reinforcement of the advanced British force
at Kasvin did not appear to be practicable.
Air Commodore Steel, referring to query No. 7, said that no
reserves of aircraft were available. Such units as might at present be
at our disposal in Egypt and India could not safely be removed in the
present unsettled state of those countries. The provision of landing
grounds and the supply of material for aircraft working in the
Caucasus and North Persia would present considerable difficulties.
The Chairman suggested that the Conference should report to
Lord Curzon in this sense.
With regard to the last four queries in Lord Curzon’s telegram,
which all related to Khorasan and our force there,
hord Hai'dInge enquired whether the War Office were satisfied
that General Malleson’s conduct of operations at Meshed was
satisfactory. The general tone of his telegrams appeared rather
alarmist.
Mr.Oliphant said that Colonel Grey, His Majesty’s Consul-General
at Meshed, who had recently arrived in England, was of opinion that
General Malleson’s reports were unnecessarily pessimistic.
Sir Arthur Hirtzel said that the India Office had been in some
doubt as to the importance to be attached to General Malleson’s
' reports, and had recently 7- telegraphed to the Government of India on
the point ; a reply had been received a few days ago, in which they
had admitted that there was some force in the suggestion, but had
said that on the whole they were satisfied with the intelligence
furnished by General Malleson. He understood that Colonel drey 7
was of opinion that General Malleson was badly served by his agents,
who were unreliable.
Mr. Winston Churchill pointed out that General Malleson was
at least consistent. His telegrams were all based on one theme,
namely, the danger of Bolshevik activities in that part of the world.
It was not as if he blew hot one day and cold the next. Having
made up his mind that the Bolshevik menace was a very real danger,
he transmitted every scrap of information which tended to bear out
that view, but without necessarily committing himself to the reliability
of the reports which he had received. He was acting more as a
reporter of rumour, and left His Majesty’s Government to decide to-
what extent these rumours were to be believed.