أوراق المؤتمر بين الإدارات حول شؤون الشرق الأوسط [و‎‎١‎٠‎٣] (٢٩٠/٢٠٥)

was impossible to foresee what would happen if he decided to do
this. There appeared to be two alternatives before His Majesty s
Grovernment: They could once more attempt to bring pressure
to bear upon Ibn Saud by issuing an ultimatum to him; cutting
down his subsidy ; and threatening to break off relations with him.
There was also the possibility of blockading him from the Persian
Gulf side, though he understood that this would not be easy. If
His Majesty’s Government decided upon this line of action, they
would run the risk of the Akhwan overrunning Arabia in the event
of Ibn Saud failing to comply with the terms of the ultimatum.
Ibn Rashid and the Idrisi might be induced to join Hussein again%
Ibn Saud, but he was not confident that even this combination
would be strong enough to check the Akhwan. 1 he other alternative
was to leave things as they were : the almost inevitable result of
this would be that King Hussein would abdicate unless we gave
him some crumbs of comfort. His abdication would be followed
bv something very like anarchy in the Hejaz. The tribes would get
completely out of hand ; the rival faction which supported Ali Haidar
would immediately raise their heads ; pilgrimages would become very
difficult, if not impossible, for a year or two, if not longer; and the
Akhwan would no doubt take advantage of the disorder in the Hejaz
to overrun the country and occupy the Holy Places.
He would be glad to be authorised to tell King Hussein on his
return to Jeddah that His Majesty’s Government adhered to their
recognition of his ownership of Khurma and Turaba.
The Chairman pointed out that Colonel Wilson’s two alternatives
both ended in the advance of the Akhwan, the only difference being
that in one case they would advance more quickly than in the other.
The suggestion that Ibn Rashid and the Idrisi should be induced to
take sides with King Hussein against Ibn Saud amounted to a
complete negation of the policy of His Majesty’s Government, which
was to introduce peace and unity into the Arabian Peninsula.
Mr. Philby thought that the position was perfectly clear. If
Colonel Wilson’s suggestion that His Majesty’s Government should
prejudge the ownership of Khurma and Turaba were accepted, the
inevitable result would be that Ibn Saud would occupy Mecca and
the whole of the Hejaz. He declined to believe that either Ibn
Rashid or the Idrisi would join Hussein against Ibn Saud. Hussein
had recently paid Ibn Rashid 25,000L, but this did not mean that
the latter was necessarily friendly to him. Even if he did join
Hussein, the Akhwan would defeat them both. He had mentioned
this view before to His Majesty’s Government, but His Majesty s
Government had disagreed with him; he had, however, been
justified by events. Replying to a question by the Chairman, he
said that Ibn Saud would not move forward if His Majesty’s
Government decided to do nothing, but he still desired an answer to
his demand for a Boundary Commission, and the presence of his
delegation in London seemed to provide a good opportunity for this
answer to be given.
Colonel Wilson, replying to a question by the Chairman, said
that King Hussein did not object to arbitration in principle, quite
the reverse ; it was only on the ownership of Khurma that he could
not accept arbitration.
The Chairman said that he could not understand Hussein’s
objections; they seemed to him to be dictated entirely by false
pride. If his claim was so incontestable, and his proofs so
unanswerable, why did he not produce them ? He did not see why
Hussein should refuse to state his case in an office to an impartial
arbiter, though he quite understood his objection to the publicity
[1569] B 2