أوراق المؤتمر بين الإدارات حول شؤون الشرق الأوسط [و‎‎١‎٠‎١] (٢٩٠/٢٠١)

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Evacuation of;
Batum.
British. He also mentioned the advice recently given by the
Afghans to the Wazirs not to make trouble.
The Chairman pointed out that by the terms of the Treaty with
Afghanistan six months must elapse from the 8th August before any
overtures could be made to the Amir. On the hypothesis of the
Government of India, he was to come up chastened and repentant
on the 8th February. Personally, he doubted very much whether
this would be his attitude, but he did not see that anything could be
done to enlist him on our side until the period of probation was over.
He gathered that the general sense of the meeting was that General
Malleson should be retained for the present, but that the railway
should not be extended.
In view of the fact that aeroplanes were not available, it would
not be possible for General Malleson to be supplied with them.
The Conference decided —
That General Malleson’s force should be retained at Meshed,
and be reinforced by one mountain battery and one
battalion of infantry, but that the extension of the railway
from Duzdap to Neh and the provision of aeroplanes should
not be sanctioned.
2. The Conference had before them: (1) Memorandum by the
Foreign Office on the Evacuation of Batum (I.D.C.E.—3605);
(2) Letter from General Milne to the \\ ar Office of the 20th October,
1919, on the Staff for Batum Province (I.D.C.E.-3607); (3) Beport
from Lieutenant-Commander Luke on the Situation in Transcaucasia
(I.D.C.E.-3608).
The Chairman said that the time did not admit of the discussion
of the various points raised in the papers which had been circulated
with the Agenda, as they involved the whole question of the future
existence of the Caucasian Bepublics. He had been under the
impression that the only point to be decided was whether we should
remain at Batum or not, but General Milne had put up an elaborate
scheme of administration which had not previously been contemplated.
Mr. Winston Churchill said that he was anxious that we should
remain at Batum with the object of providing a focus for Denikin,
and of ensuring his oil supply. He had already instituted an orderly
administration there, and he did not quite understand why it was
necessary to start the very elaborate reconstruction proposed by
General Milne. It was clearly desirable that we should not evacuate
Batum, but some convincing reason would have to be given as a
reply to possible objections in Parliament and elsewhere.
Mr. Kidston pointed out that by Article 15 of the Armistice with
Turkev, which provided for an Allied occupation of Batum, we were
practically bound to remain there until the peace settlement.
The Conference decided —
That no immediate action was necessary, and that the discussion
of the various questions raised in the Agenda should be
deferred to a future meeting, but that the War Office
should telegraph to General Milne informing him that there
was no present intention of evacuating Batum, and that
until he received other instructions he should maintain the
existing administrative arrangements.
(Initialled) C. of K.
Foreign Ofjice,
November 18, 19 i 9.