أوراق المؤتمر بين الإدارات حول شؤون الشرق الأوسط [و‎‎٧‎٤] (٢٩٠/١٤٧)

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7’/ife Chairman pointed out that he could have understood this
lirie being taken by the Indian Moslems if‘ it were a question of
supporting Husspin against the Caliph, but he was inclined to think
that if the Moslems of India were appealed to to protect the Holy
Places from a fanatical horde of Wahabis, who might be expected to
cause serious damage in the Sacred Cities, they would fly to the
rescue.
Mr. Shuckburgh observed that to the Moslem agitator any stick
was good enough to beat the Government with. However illogical
their attitude might be the effect of their appeals would have to be
reckoned with.
Major Young, replying to a question by the Chairman, said that
the detachment of Indian Mahommedans who had volunteered for
service with the Sherif Feisal, had done excellent work even when
actually fighting against the Sultan’s troops, and had unanimously
volunteered to return to Feisal’s army on the expiration of their
leave to India.
Any disaffection among Indian Moslem troops in Mesopotamia
had been prompted by reluctance to participate in operations against
the Guardian Power of the Shiah Holy Places, and did not, he
thought, offer an analogy to any proposal to protect the Holy Places
of the Hejaz. At the same time he was strongly opposed to the
despatch of troops to the Hejaz at all, if it could be avoided, and
thought that any action in this sense should bo confined to covering
Jeddah if it became necessary to evacuate British subjects.
The Chairman, replying to a suggestion by Mr. Shuckburgh,
said that when it had been proposed to send Soudanese troops to
Rabegh, the idea had not been accepted with alacrity. He thought,
however, that the General Officer Commanding Egypt Force might
be asked by telegraph what troops would be available in the event
of Colonel Wilson’s apprehensions being justified and the Wahabis
advancing on Jeddah. It was possible that events might move
very rapidly, and he did not think that we ought to wait until the
fatal event happened before taking any steps. As far as he
remembered we used to have a lien on available shipping in
Egyptian waters in the earlier days of the war, and he thought that
the Ministry of Shipping should be asked what shipping would be
available to proceed to Jeddah at short notice.
Captain Aylmer said that the Admiralty had telegraphed that
day to the Admiral, who was now at sea on his way from Kamaran
to Suez. He had been instructed to report on the situation at
Jeddah. B-sides the Admiral’s sloop, and H.M.S. “Clio” at Port
Soudan, there was a light cruiser at Hodeidah.
Mr. Montagu pointed out that Colonel Wilson at Jeddah was
apparently in communication with H.M.S. “ Clio.” He mentioned
that he had already asked the Government of India their views on
the question generally, but he agreed with the Chairman that a
further enquiry might be made as to the steps to he taken in the
event of the general exodus to Jeddah, feared by Colonel Wilson.
He proposed, in addition, to obtain the views of the Indian
Mahommedan member of the India Council.
Miss Bell, replying to a question by Mr. Montagu, said that
she did not think any good could be done by attacking Ibn Sand
from the Persian Gulf side ; it was clearly out of the question for
troops to invade his territory, and there was nothing on the coast of
Hasa which could be usefully bombarded.
General Radcliffe said that the War Office would find great
difficulty in providing troops, for the Hejaz. It was possible that
General Allenby might be able to send a battalion from Syria,
which could be replaced from among the troops which were being