أوراق المؤتمر بين الإدارات حول شؤون الشرق الأوسط [و‎‎٤‎٠] (٢٩٠/٧٩)

f987>—309 I
Effect of Situation
in the Easpian on
our General Policy.
advise the Government. In response to this Colonel Stokes, 10 th
Hussars, and Major McDonel are leaving Tiflis. Milne asks for
permission to send with them Tcherhoeff, President of the Peace
Mission of the Caucasus, who could best put forward the case.
Another factor which complicates the position is the naval
situation in the Caspian. This is fully dealt with in a memorandum
by the Admiralty (filed) which points out that the Caspian must be
cleared of the enemy as early as possible if our position is to he
maintained. Immediate action is required—
(a.) Against the Bolshevist Russian flotilla (this was discussed
at the 8 th I.D.C.E. Meeting, and orders were issued.
The Bolshevist crews were to be got rid of by to-day,
1 st March) ;
(b.) Against the Astrakhan fleet before the ice breaks, and before
they can be further reinforced ; and
(c.) With regard to the co-operation between the navy and the
volunteer army (see telegram No. 278) orders are
required.
The naval necessities in the Caspian seem to come into conflict
with our Caucasus policy as a whole. Thus ;—
The army programme is a watch-dog policy to concentrate on
the Batoum-Baku line, and maintain an attitude of non-interference
pending result of Peace Conference. (Telegram No. 75327.)
It is admitted that the maintenance of a force on the Batoum-
Baku line is essential.
This force could not be so maintained without the navy to guard
its flanks. (Admiralty note.)
The navy cannot guard the flanks without controlling the
Caspian.
The control of the Caspian demands that our fleet should attack
the Astrakan-Bolshevist. (Admiralty note.)
But such an attack entails co-operation with the army.
(Admiralty note.)
Therefore our troops must go forward. (Petrovsk, and possibly
further.)
The Admiralty asks for a clear definition of\policy.
IV. Our position and Commitments towards the Trans-Caucasian Republics.
1 Georgia. —Georgia is at once the most homogeneous of these nascent States, and that
which on historical grounds possesses the clearest right to self-determination.
The present Government, while selfish and corrupt (General Milne’s report of 6 th
February), is nevertheless the best available at the present time, and though its ultra-
socialist members (Cheidze and Tseretelli, the former of whom as President of the first
Soldier’s and Workmen’s Council, played so disastrous a part in the demoralisation of
the Russian army) have carried it very far on the policy of land nationalisation and in
other directions, there seems no real reason to believe that the Government themselves
contemplate adopting the programme of Bolshevism, which is, however, said to be
gaining ground among the masses. On the contrary, a wireless invitation from the
Bolshevists for assistance against Baku, the interception of which General Poole reported
from Ekaterinodar in January, has apparently been disregarded.
Feeling in Georgia appears to be strongly opposed to a renewal of the Russian
connection, and to he somewhat unfriendly towards Great Britain owing ( 1 ) to our
connection with Denikin ; ( 2 ) to suspicion of our objects in Trans-Caucasia.
The Georgian-Moslem element, which is predominant at Batum, is hostile to the
Georgians proper. The town and province are at present under a British military
governor, and their separatist tendencies seem to emphasise the necessity for allowing
the town a special position as a free port in the final settlement.
Our commitments towards Georgia are confined to a general message of sympathy.
(Letter of 30th December to Georgian delegates in London, 201883)
There are representatives of the Georgian Government now in Baris.