"مسائل متنوعة. بلاد فارس ١٨٨٢-١٨٩٨: خرائط، أوراق حكومية ... إلخ". [و‎‎٤] (٢٠٢/٧)

tromryttw
o
o
adopt any specified course of action. I cannot see
why any such intimation need be so worded (as the
India Office seems to fear) as to constitute an
obligation upon us to strike, whether the moment
is, or is not, opportune. On the other hand, it is
surely clear that Russia cannot be suffered to annex
Khorasan, or any of the northern provinces of
Persia, while we sit still and do nothing. Other
wise, why have we a policy and a Minister in Persia
at all ? The danger is that if there be (as is possible)
a disturbed succession, the Russians will slip troops
into Meshed, or Kuchan, or Astrabad, on the
pretext of local disorder or menace to Russian
interests, and that once there they will not be got
out again. We do not want any Persian Chanta-
buns. Such a contingency is much less likely to
arise if the Russians know in advance (as they must
already conjecture) that it would probably be the
signal for a corresponding British move elsewhere.
They want Persia, not merely for the intrinsic value
of the northern provinces, but in order to get to the
Gulf; and they will not rashly take any step that
would effectually, and at a blow, prevent the realiza
tion of that dream.
I would suggest, therefore, as a wise precaution
(assuming that Russia declines to renew, or evades
renewing, the former guarantee), that Sir iN. O’Conor
be instructed, in the course of his conversation at
St. Petersburg!! about a peaceful succession—which
Ins suggestion of Anglo-Russian co-operation will
show to be the primary object of British policy—
to observe that a disturbed succession might lead
to results which neither party would wish to pre
cipitate ; since any temptation that Russia might
experience to intervene in the protection of her own
interests in the north, might provoke a correspond
ing temptation to Great Britain to safeguard her
own even greater interests in the south.
Ought we not, however, to look even a little
further ahead ? Supposing that such a warning is
given and is disregarded, and supposing that Russia
does, upon some pretext, suddenly occupy and
absorb an important part of North Persia, what
line do our military authorities at home and in
India, what line does the Indian Government itself
take as to the policy and practicability of holding
certain—and, if so, which—of the Gulf ports, and
of occupying, influencing, or protecting any—and,
if so, which—of the southern provinces ? During
the last Conservative Government in IS91, I
remember Balfour telling me that he had been