ملف ١٧٤٩\ ١٩٢١ "الخليج الفارسي:- ملخصات إخبارية للمقيمية البريطانية ١٩٢١-١٩٢٥" [و‎‎١‎٣‎١] (٤٩٤/٢٧٦)

from anything like a defiant attitude towards the Central Government, and to cultivate
good relations with the Minister for War, which I believed to be perfectly possible if
they set about it the right way, and to deprive him of any pretext for hostile action.
In either case my advice was gratefully received and its wisdom acknowledged. In the
case of the sheikh the situation has been much improved by the withdrawal of the
^Governor-General of Arabistan, Moayyed-ed-Dowleh, and his impending replacement by
Mushir-ed-Dowleh, whose record as Governor-General of the Gulf Ports, whence he is
now being transferred, has been satisfactory. I am reporting in a separate despatch on
the subject of Moayyed-ed-Dowleh, who, I am convinced, was at the bottom of the
major part of the mischief.
As regards the Bakhtiari, the case is less easy. The local khans and the tribesmen
are thoroughly alarmed ; ever since I came here they have been convinced that, sooner
or later, Reza Khan would force an issue with them, and that he meant to break their
power, as it w’as one of the principal obstacles to the completion of his dictatorial
domination. The disaster of the Arabistan force—quite apart from the question
whether the Bakhtiari were responsible for it—obviously gave Reza Khan a pretext for
putting his scheme into execution and, what is more, assured to him the support in so
doing of what passes for public opinion in this country. Furthermore, when later on
the campaign against Simko had been brought to a victorious issue, Reza Khan was
free to turn his army against the Bakhtiari should he wish to do so. It has become
axiomatic that when the Bakhtiari feel themselves or their interests seriously threatened
they turn to His Majesty’s Legation for advice and assistance, and this case is no
exception to the rule. I have consistently told them that they can do more to help
themselves than anyone else, and that so long as their attitude is moderate and sensible
they can count on my moral support as heretofore ; but that it would serve neither their
interests nor ours for the Legation to thrust itself into the forefront of what is a
domestic Persian question, and that my intervention will only gain in strength by being
kept in reserve for a much more serious occasion than any that has yet arisen. The
Tehran khans have recognised the soundness of this attitude, and Sardar Jang, whom
I. regarded as by far the ablest of the khans, has proceeded on the lines of my
suggestion both with the Prime Minister and with Sardar Sepah ; he has shown great
ability and tact in conducting these conversations, with the result that he is being
delegated by the Persian Government to proceed himself to Bakhtiari and there, in
company with a commissioner appointed by the Tehran Government, to investigate the
whole incident, to arrest and bring the leading culprits to Tehran, and generally to clear
up the situation. Sardar Jang would not start, however, without my final advice ; I
gave it unhesitatingly in the sense of accepting the mission, but I recommended him
not to stay away too long, as his presence is much needed in Tehran so long as there is
any doubt in regard to the Government’s intentions. I have also asked him to
represent very seriously to the leading local khans my views on the whole subject and
to urge them to abstain steadfastly from any provocative action ; furthermore, 1
suggested that he should bring back with him two of the local khans, with authority
to speak on behalf of the tribes, and try to conclude some arrangement with the
Persian Government so as to determine the limits within which the national authorities
and the Bakhtiari khans are respectively responsible for the maintenance of peace and
order, in order to minimise the risk of skirmishing between the two parties which has
of late been unpleasantly frequent in the Burburud and Feredan districts.
I shall, of course, continue to use any opportunity to urge counsels of moderation
on the Persian Government and on Sardar Sepah; my calculation is that the longer a
collision is postponed the less likely it is to occur, and the greater chance there is of an
adjustment of the differences in the time-honoured Persian manner. Ihis part of the
task, however, is considerably less easy, for Reza Khan is a man with a will, and if he
seriously means to deal the Bakhtiari a blow, and his hands are free in other directions,
he will take a great deal of stopping. Furthermore, nothing is less palatable to the
Persian Government in present conditions than advice from a British source. I he
Persian Government have a guilty conscience in regard to us, if, indeed, the possession
of a conscience at all can correctly be attributed to them ; they are secretive in regard
to their plans because they know, whatever they may prefer to believe, that our
influence in this country is not broken and that we still possess plenty of means for
thwarting their plans if we regard them as unwise or prejudicial ; lastly, they are in
terror of being accused by the Medjliss and the press of being subservient to foreign
influence and obedient to foreign instructions.
I cannot pretend that the situation as reviewed in this despatch is a satisfactory
one. I trust, however, that your Lordship will be satisfied that, having regard to the
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