ملف ١٧٤٩\ ١٩٢١ "الخليج الفارسي:- ملخصات إخبارية للمقيمية البريطانية ١٩٢١-١٩٢٥" [و‎‎١‎٢‎٨] (٤٩٤/٢٧٠)

[This Docmnent is the Property of His Britannic Majesty s Government.]
PERSIA.
[November 8.J
CONFIDENTIAL.
Section 13.
[E 12251/6/34 J No. 1.
Sir P. Loraine to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. — (Received November 8.)
(No. 582. Confidential.)
My Lord, ^ Tehran, September 21, 1922.
THE rout of the military detachment, destined by the Persian Government to act
as a bodyguard for the Governor-General of Arabistan at the Shalil caravanserai while
on its way down the Bakhtiari road, was attended by such peculiar circumstances and
raises issues of so much wider a character than is immediately apparent, that I have the
honour to supplement the various telegrams which it was necessary to address to your
Lordship on the subject by the following narrative of events :—
In the month of April a report reached me that the Minister for War. in pursuance
of the plan for gradually bringing the outlying provincial centres under the direct
military control of Tehran, which, through various vicissitudes in his personal fortunes,
he has steadfastly kept in view, contemplated the despatch of a force to Arabistan.
News of this step had likewise reached the Sheikh of Mohammerah, and not unnaturally
inspired him with considerable apprehension. His Excellency, as was to be expected,
made an urgent appeal to the British authorities in Persia to intervene and protect him
from what he judged to be a direct menace to his personal position, his considerable
local interests and the security of his territories. The sheikh’s point of view was
certainly important, especially having regard to the obligations which we have accepte i
to protect his interests, and his apprehensions were clearly not without some
justification. Other considerations, however, besides the sheikh’s position and interests,
had to be borne in mind when deciding on a course of action : firstly, the effect of the
proposed step on the operations of the Anglo-PersLn Oil Company ; secondly, the effect
of any action taken here on our relations with the Persian Government generally, and
with Sardar Sepah particularly, the latter having hitherto shown on the whole a
friendly demeanour and a marked inclination to resist the spread of Bolshevik influence
and ideas.
The Sheikh of Mohammerah was at the moment very unpopular in Tehran. The
Government, as usual in a state of utter impecuniousness, was striving to collect a few
tomans from any possible source, and had fixed on the vexed question of the sheikh’s
“ maliyat,” or land revenue, to build up a grievance against the latter, which was
carefully fostered in the Medjliss and the press, and, of course, received every
encouragement from the Bolsheviks, who had already successfully launched the idea of
a federation of southern chieftains, formed under the aegis of His Majesty’s Government,
to resist the authority of the Central Government and ultimately to render a partition
of Persia inevitable. It was freely stated that the sheikh owed huge sums for arrears
of revenue, and that he was sheltering himself behind British power in order to avoid
payment; that if he maintained his refusal to pay, he must be coerced into doing so,
and at that moment any steps taken against him to enforce payment would have been
enthusiastically supported by the pack of demagogues who in present circumstances
represent articulate public opinion in this country. The actual question of the sheikh’s
“ maliyat ” is a tiresome and complicate done, with the details of which I need not trouble
your Lordship ; as is the case with all financial transactions in this country, it was
obscured by a dense mist of claims and counter-claims, of pledges which one party
regarded as binding and the other as invalid, and of settlements promised by one Govern
ment and unfulfilled by its successor. I must add that, so far as I could judge, there
was some truth in the allegation that the sheikh was sheltering himself behind us in order
to extract the most favourable terms possible from the Persian Government and t<>
make the minimum payment consistent with dire necessity. On the other hand, the
Persian Government was evidently bent on screwing the uttermost kran out of him.
The matter was not a direct British concern, and the less we are involved in it the
better; but unfortunately the sheikh lias in his possession a telegram from Sir P. Cox,
which he frequently invokes, announcing the terms of an agreement, both as regards
present and future payments, accepted by Vossugh-ed-Dowleh, but which was never
ratified by that statesman during his tenure of office, and was denounced by
his successor.
[159 h—13]
B