ملاحظات أُعدت كمرجع خلال جولة كرزون في الخليج الفارسي، وأوراق أخرى عن بلاد فارس والخليج الفارسي [و‎‎٨‎٨] (٦٧٨/١٧٥)

only portion of onr Empire where she could hope to deal us such a serious
blow as would bring us to terras and finish the war. Operating from her pre
sent bases, a campaign against India would he a very difficult matter. It is
true that with the railways now in existence and still more after the Tashkend-
Orenhurg line is completed, she could place a large number of troops and
supplies at any points on her railway systems, hut her difficulties then only
commence. Before she can even make a start, she must collect and organize
very large bodies of transport, for the provision of which so far as we know
no adequate organization exists in peace time, and with each step into Afghan
istan these difficulties are enormously increased. If in addition to opera
tions through Afghan territory, a column were sent from Trans-Caspia
towards Seistan, and this would most probably he done if only to keep our
troops there engaged and prevent their acting against the flank of the line
Herat-Kandahar, it would still further add to her transport difficulties, for this
column would be mainly dependent on Khorassan for its transport and any
large force advancing from Kushk on Herat would also require to draw largely
on the neighbourhood of Mehsed for the carriage it would require. If
we were acting with Japan as our ally, considerable pressure would also ho
exerted against Bussia in the Ear East, and this with the operations against
India would he a very severe drain on her resources. Under these circum
stances, she would he hardly prepared to undertake a separate expedition against
the armed tribesmen of South-West Persia, if these were prepared to offer a
determined resistance, though doubtless, if unopposed, she would occupy the
country at least as far south as Isfahan. The present state, of our knowledge
regarding the tribes mentioned above, is not sufficient to justify the expres
sion of any very decided opinion as to the amount of resistance they would,
with active British support, he able and willing to offer to Bussia. The dif
ferent estimates of their numbers, fighting qualities and disposition are
greatly at variance, but so far as they go, they are at least sufficient to
justify the opinion that a scheme, such as that indicated, for utilising
them to oppose a Bussian advance is worthy of serious examination. The
first thing we require is accurate information, and with this object as well as
that of spreading our influence among them generally, selected officers might
be attached to our Consulates at Isfahan and Bushire, and possibly also at
Kermanshah, whose main duty would he to travel about among them. It
would also go far to increase our influence with them, and would assist greatly
in forming an accurate judgment of their military capacities, if small bodies
could now be enlisted in our service. The guard of Indian sawars at Isfahan
miriit he replaced by an equal number of selected Bakhtiari tribesmen, pre
ferably men belonging to or connected with influential families. A small
force on the lines of the local frontier levies in India might he enlisted as
guards for the Shuster-Isfahan road (both the above could be under an officer
at Isfahan), and in the event of a road being made through the Lur country, a
similar force migut be raised among that tribe.
If some steps such as these were taken, and if a closer knowledge of these
tribes justified the hopes that they could be induced to offer active opposition to
Bussian occupation of Isfahan and the country to the south of it, we ^could in
case of war with Bussia, by supplying them with arms, ammunition and money,
and bv sending officers to organise their resistance, at least do something to
prevent this important part of Persia from falling into the hands of our enemies.
In the other case of an occupation by Bussia of the north of Persia and
the collapse of the Government of the latter country, it would only be necessary
to send to Isfahan a force sufficient to emphasise the fact that we consider
this part of Persia within our sphere and are not prepared to give it up. It
has been urged that this latter course might he made by Bussia a. cams
belli. What Prussia wants is possession of the southern coast of Persia and
free access to the sea, and this can only be secured to her by the occupation of
Bunder Abbas or some port further to the east. Unless we are going to. give
her this, we must make up our minds to fight for it, if necessaiy, and if we
could count on the assistance of the Bakhtiaris and other tribes, it would be
easier for us to defend Bunder Abbas from Seistan and the line Isfahan to the
Turkish frontier than from any other line further to the east.
The 13th June 1903. (Signed) J. A. DOUGLAS.
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