ملاحظات أُعدت كمرجع خلال جولة كرزون في الخليج الفارسي، وأوراق أخرى عن بلاد فارس والخليج الفارسي [ظ‎‎٨‎٥] (٦٧٨/١٧٠)

if she ventured to make any, would be answered much as were those of
Denmark when we seized the Danish fleet to prevent its being captured by
Napoleon. In such a case the detachment of any troops from the defence of
India for operations in the interior of southern Persia would be of no advantage,
even if it were feasible, and Persia, except where parts of her territory were
more or less temporarily occupied for its own convenience by one or other of
the hostile armies, would doubtless lapse into a condition of anarchy similar
to that which prevailed between the death of Nadir Shah and the accession of
the Kajar Dynasty, until her future status and Government were settled with
out reference to herself by England and Russia at the peace.
The position would, however, be very different if the entry of Russian
troops into Persia were occasioned by a question arising within Persia itself,
for it may, I think, be taken for granted that if we did not, in the event of a
Russian invasion of northern Persia, do more than hold Bunder Abbas and
Seistan, Russia would take possession of all the rest of the country, at any
rate of the great cities and of the routes connecting them, and would not
evacuate it until she had reduced it, like Manchuria, to the condition of a
Russian Egypt. She might, as the price of our acquiescence in this state of
things, leave us Seistan and Bunder Abbas, and I do not see why she should
not do so, if she had all the rest of the sea-board and of Khorassan, for once
she had made her military railways through Persia to the coast and to our
Indian frontier and had connected them with the existing system she would
have acquired the means of taking these places from us later on without very
great difficulty, unless of course we became, not merely as we should do in
a geographical sense, but in respect of our military system, a regular con
tinental power.
She might not indeed need to occupy the whole or even the greater part of
Persia. If she marched into Tabriz, Tehran and Meshed, put down the revolu
tionary movement by stern measures in those cities and reorganised the Per
sian army as Sir Evelyn Wood did that of Egypt, she might well afford to-
evacuate the country on condition that we withdrew simultaneously from
Seistan and Bunder Abbas. Persia would, however, from that moment be to
all intents and purposes a Russian Egypt, even if no regular Russian garrison
remained within its borders, and English influence would be as completely dead
and buried, not merely at Tehran but throughout the length and breadth of the
land, as Erench influence has been in the Nile Valley since the day when
Colonel Marchand hauled the tricolor down at Eashoda. It may, in fact, be
doubted whether we should not he more discredited in the eyes of the Persians
and Afghans, and throughout the Mahomedan world, if we* abandoned Persia,
all except a few outlying points, to he dealt with by a Russian army as it
pleased, without making an affort to assert our rights and interests in a coun
try in which we have hitherto claimed a position of at least equality, than if we
were to strike in defence of them a momentarily unsuccessful blow.
In any case the effacement of British influence in Persia, whether brought
about by our acquiescence in a temporary or permanent occupation by RusGa
of the greater part of the country, including the present and ancient capitals
would he so damaging to our prestige throughout Asia that it is worth while
considering, before we finally decide to endure it, whether we could not, besides
holding Seistan and Bunder Abbas, occupy, in alliance with the Arabs, Bakhtia-
ris and other south Persian tribes, the corner of South-West Persia, described in
Major Douglas’ memorandum, and even put a few thousand men into Isfahan
our occupation of which, as the old historical metropolis of Persia would
balance a Russian occupation of Tehran and deprive the Russians of any excuse
for advancing further south on the pretext of preserving the Shah’s authority
m the southern portion of his kingdom. It would probably not be necessary
for us to take any military measures in-the interior of Ears or of Kerman for
the presence of a Russian force at Tehran and of a British force supported by
the Bakhtians at Isfahan, or within striking distance of it, would, in all likeli
hood, put an end to a revolutionary movement whose leaders would have to
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