ملاحظات أُعدت كمرجع خلال جولة كرزون في الخليج الفارسي، وأوراق أخرى عن بلاد فارس والخليج الفارسي [و‎‎٨‎٣] (٦٧٨/١٦٥)

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office, December 2 , 1902 .
ISFCFET.]
THE PERSIAN QUESTION.
A Conference was held at the Foreign Office on Wednesday, the 19th November, 1902, to
discuss certain questions relating to Persia, and to consider the papers laid before it.
The Representatives of the various Departments present at it were the following :—
Admiralty—
Prince Louis of Battenberg (Director of Naval Intelligence).
Captain Armstrong, r. m. l. i.
Foreign Office—
Sir T. Sanderson.
India Office— ,
Sir A. Godley.
Sir W. Lee-Warner.
War Office—
Lieutenant-General Sir W. Nicholson (Director-General of Military Intel
ligence) .
Lieutenant-Colonel Altham.
The papers, which had been circulated to the Members of the Conference, including Memo
randa from the War Office and the Admiralty, were taken as read.
1, The first question discussed was the following :—
“What action, if any, should be taken in respect of Persia by Great Britain, in the event
of war between Great Britain and Russia—it being assumed that in such a war Russia might
have the support of France, but that Great Britain could not count on that of any European
Power.”
Sir W. Nicholson stated that the military forces available at the outset in the contingency
referred to would be three Army Corps, and that the necessary reinforcements of the Indian
army for the defence of India would practically absorb the whole of this force. No troops
would, therefore, be available for operations in Persia. The attitude of Afghanistan was
uncertain. Persia was not in a position to offer any resistance to the use of her territory in
the north as a route for a Russian advance. The distance to be traversed and the difficult
nature of the intervening country rendered it unlikely that any effective attack could be
organized against the flank of the Russian advance by means of the tribes round Mohammerah
and in other parts of Southern Persia.
As regards naval considerations, Prince Louis of Battenberg stated that no naval base
or station was required in the Gulf, and that a Russian naval station there would not be formid
able unless fortified, and, above all, with its communications by land fully established. He
also stated that the Admiralty view was fully set forth in the Memorandum dated November
12, 1902.
In these circumstances, it was held that, in the event of war, our action in the direction
of Persia should be limited to (1) the occupation of Seistan, or to holding a force ready for
the purpose within striking distance; (2) the seizure and occupation by Indian troops of
Bandar Abbas, with the adjoining Islands of Kishm, Hanjam, and Ormuz; (3) the exclusion
of any foreign Power from the Isthmus of Maklab to Mosandim Point and along the El
Batineh coast between Khor Khalba and Dibba, as far as circumstances would admit; and (1)
the protection of British subjects and trades at Bushire, so long as no serious operations on
land were required at that port. The visits of British ships to other islands and ports in the
Gulf would otherwise suffice to maintain our influence there as far as circumstances would
allow.
2. The second question propounded was :—
“ What action would it be expedient that Great Britain should take in the event of
disorders occurring in Persia, and occasioning a Russian occupation in the north—or in
anticipation of such disorder—it being understood that occupation by Great Britain of Persian
territory would not be directed against Russia, but would be undertaken in the interests
of peace and order, and as an assertion of the position of Great Britain as jointly interested
with Russia in the maintenance of the Persian kingdom.”