ملاحظات أُعدت كمرجع خلال جولة كرزون في الخليج الفارسي، وأوراق أخرى عن بلاد فارس والخليج الفارسي [و‎‎٢] (٦٧٨/٣)

PROPOSALS OP LIEUTENANT-COLONEL KEMBALL, C.I.E., AND MAJOR COX,
C.I.E., FOR ANNOUNCEMENT v TO BE MADE BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE
VICEROY IN THE PERSIAN GULF.
Extract from a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Kemball, C.I.iE., Tolitical Resident
in the Persian Gulf, dated the 29th August 1903.
** هذه التواريخ تقريبية ** هذه التواريخ تقريبية ** هذه التواريخ تقريبية *
With regard to the political aspect of the case. I fear I must ask you to
let me have time to think over this matter. So far as I can say at present,
I do not think that, so far as the Trucial Chiefs and the Chief of Bahrein are
concerned, any fresh arrangements in the way of new forms of engagement
will be desired. Maskat enjoys a different status, and perhaps some modifica
tion or expansion of the status quo may he desirable, but I would like to
consult Cox in this matter. The Chief of Koweit may very possibly desire
some more definite agreement.
** هذه التواريخ تقريبية ** هذه التواريخ تقريبية ** هذه التواريخ تقريبية *
Extract from a letter from Major P.Z. Cox, C.I.E, Political Agent at Maskat, dated' the
6th September 1903.
** هذه التواريخ تقريبية ** هذه التواريخ تقريبية ** هذه التواريخ تقريبية *
If Maskat is to be the first place of call, I do not think the visit of the
Viceroy would be a good occasion for pressing upon the Sultan anything in the
nature of the request for a concession, such as the lease of the Gwadur Customs.
News would fly ahead quickly, and the Pirate Coast Chiefs or others might
become apprehensive.
** هذه التواريخ تقريبية ** هذه التواريخ تقريبية ** هذه التواريخ تقريبية *
Our Commercial Treaty with Maskat is under consideration with a view
to renewal, and apj irt from this^any new form of engagement which would be ?
compatible with the Anglo-IYench Declaration of 1862 does not seem to be
practicable, but there are two points with regard to which it would seem
possible for us to strengthen the Sultan’s hands and at the same time increase
our own influence, and if there is no inherent objection to the proposals that
follow, the Viceroy might feel able to make a statement in Durbar in connec
tion therewith.
1. Having been unmoved spectators of the attack on Maskat in 1895,
during wMck the property of our subjects was looted and destroyed, and the
Sultan himself lost everything he had, His Majesty’s Government realised that
then* commercial and political interests in Maskat were such that they could
not afford to see the incident repeated. The Sheikhs of Oman were, therefore,
informed that in future the British Government would not permit Maskat or
Matra to be attacked. That is the present positi on, and the intimation to the
Sheikhs of Oman has proved quite sufficient hitherto so far as Maskat is con-
cerned. Couid not the present opportunity be used to inform the Oman
public that the above policy will be extended in future to all ports in Oman
Wx eie ar e communities of British traders, and consequently British inter-
ests We have every reasonable ground for assuming such an attitude as it
is m the interests of all peaceable traders alike, whether they be British or
native. As a case in point, at the present moment while there is trouble at
Bostak,. I cannot but be anxious for the safety of our subjects at the ports of
,! e ^ a tineh Coast, and have arranged for a man-of-war to remain here for
the present;-but if the tribes had been informed in the sense that I now sug-
gos , ey would accept the intimation, and the danger of trouble to our sub
jects would be very much less.
It might even be possible to go beyond the limits of the above intimation,
but 1 am less confident on the latter point, which I will now explain.