أوراق اللجنة الشرقية التابعة لمجلس الحرب [ظ‎‎٢‎٦‎١] (٥٤٤/٥٢٢)

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as we are concerned, into our sphere. The first of these is Bin Sand, with whom we
made a treaty in December 1915. Bin Saild, as we all know here, is the Amir <>f Nejd,
and he is a formidable Arab chieftain inheriting considerable prestige, and although
of a somewhat pugnacious .and turbulent description, at the same time lie possesses
a distinct and rather powerful personality. In our treaty with him of December 1915,
we recognised him as the independent Sovereign of certain territories to be defined
hereafter. These territories, broadly spreaking, are Nejd, Al-Hasa, Katif (<>r Jubail).
We promised him protection against aggression by any foreign Power to such extent
and in such manner as, after consulting with Bin Saud himself, we might think most
effective, and the Committee will remember the difficulty we have had over the
interpretation of the phrase “ foreign Power,” because when the collision occurred
between his men and King Hussein’s over Khurma, we had to explain that by “ foreign
Power” we did not mean any Power differing from his own : in other words, we did
not mean an Arabian Power, but we did mean Turkey or a European Power. I will
not pause to argue the question of Bin Saud, which has been a very troublesome one.
In my own mind I cannot help thinking that he and King Hussein will sooner or later
have to tight it out, and perhaps it is the best thing that could happen if they did so.
If they do not, I suppose that when the war comes to an end vve shall have to make
some effort to define the boundaries of these two chiefs and to keep them at peace
with each other. In the friction and conflict between the two, I think we shall all
agree that our interests lie rather on the side of Hussein than they do on the side
of Bin Saud. One of the most useful moves that has been made lately is taking
Bin Saud out of the Indian sphere and bringing him into relations, as we have done, with
the Jeddah side.
MR. MONTAGU : I do not think the proposal is to transfer him from the Indian
side. 1 think all that has happened is that Pbilby had been removed and that
Wingate had been asked to suggest to us a successor to Phdby. I think Bin Saud is
still where he was.
LORD CURZON : I was alluding not merely to that, but also to the proposal
that communications which are addressed to him now should be sent from the
Jeddah side.
MR. SHUCK BURGH : Even that has broken down. Wingate is very much
against it.
LORD CURZON : Is your point that you think the old orientation not only
does remain, but ought to remain ?
MR. SHUCKBURGH : Not that it ought to remain, but that in point of fact it
does remain.
LORD CURZON : Next there are the groups of chiefs on the eastern shores of
the Red Sea—who were under Turkish sovereignty or suzerainty, with differing degrees
of independence, before the war —the Idrisi, the Imam of Sana’a, and the Sheikh of
Havia.
LORD ROBERT CECIL : Are you coming back to Rashid ?
LORD CUHZON : 1 had omitted Rashid. Just as Bin Saud threw in his lot
with us, so Bin Rashid threw in his lot with the Turks. I think he ht Id Turkish
military rank, and undoubtedly, in the earlier years of the war, he was in close
communication with them. We remember the difficulties that arose between Bin
Rashid and Bin Saud. At one moment we encouraged Bin Saud to attaek and
demolish Rashid. Later on we gave the opposite advice. t
LORD ROBERT CECIL : He would not do anything for months, and then, when,
things were getting more favourable, he thought of doing something, but by that time
we thought it was useless that he should do anything.
LORD ( URZON : Meanwhile, Bin Rashid solved the difficulty by making his
p> ace with King Hussein, and therefore he may be said to have passed over into our
sphere, and need no longer be treated as Turcophile. I conclude that his relations
with the Tuikish Government have come to an end, and that that question will only
arise io the event of our requhing from the Turks any general renunciation of their
claims in that part of the world.
To revert to the chiefs on the eastern shores of the Red Sea, the Idrisi was
pract ically independent before the war, though we recognised him in the agicements of