أوراق اللجنة الشرقية التابعة لمجلس الحرب [ظ‎‎٢‎٠‎٦] (٥٤٤/٤١٢)

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LORD ROBERT CECIL: What was your phrase?
LORD CURZON: I suggested the words, and General Smuts supports me r
“ are a matter that in the main concern themselves.” Do you object, Mr. Balfour?
MR. BALFOUR: Not at all.
LORD CURZON: Then we will take No. 7.
MR. MONTAGU: If you say that something was decided at the last meeting
after I left I have no locus standi,, but I enter the possible objection that we should
not advise the Government to undertake the responsibility for maintaining order
in the Caucasus. You will not accept the French, and you do not like the Americans;
therefore the only alternative is to let the Caucasus go into anarchy as they choose
on their own responsibility. I think this country would never submit to having
a protectorate over the Caucasus, simply because it is believed that there are
strategical positions there which would be of advantage to us in the future.
LORD CURZON: Do we say anything inconsistent with that? I do not share
your views, but all we say, after stating the various alternatives is this, and I took
down the woirds from something that fell from Mr. Balfour, who was against the
view I was arguing: “ Only in the last resort, and reluctantly if pressed to do so,
would Great Britain provisionally accept the task.” It is not an instruction to
our representatives at the Peace Conference to accept it.
LORD ROBERT CECIL : I do not think he went as far as that. He said, “ In
that case we would consider it.” I remember he said he would not go as far as you
upon that.
MR. BALFOUR: I do not pretend to remember. I admit I am very much
afraid of some of the things we are proposing to do at this Conference. The
Colonial Office would like to take up as many colonies as they could get. We talk of
huge protectorates all over the place. I am really frightened at the responsibilities
which we are taking upon ourselves, because who has to bear those responsibilities?
Two offices in the main—the Treasury and the War Office. The Admiralty can
manage quite well, but the War Office and the Treasury are mainly concerned.
Where are they going to find the men or the money for these things ? I do not know.
Those matters are never considered. We consider the advantage to the natives, the
advantage to our prestige ; we consider certain things connected with trade and com
merce, and all the rest of it; but money and men I have never seen referred to, and
they seem to me to be the governing considerations.
GENERAL SMUTS: “ Provisionally ” is the important word. I do not gather
that your recommendation is that we should go for good to the Caucasus.
LORD CURZON : Heaven forbid!
GENERAL SMUTS : What is going to be done in the meantime ? That is the
question. Something will have to be done unless there is to be absolute chaos in that
area. The Peace will find us there; we shall be sitting there.
MR. MONTAGU : This resolution, as drafted, starts out by saying that if there
is a Great Power wanted America is preferable to France, that France is undesirable,
and that reluctantly we can be the Power. I. agree it is most unfortunate for the
Caucasians if there is disorder there, but why should we be there at all? Lord
Curzon says, “ I do not want to be there permanently,” but how long does he want
to be there ? Presumably until these States are ready to stand upon their own. How
long is that going to be? How many years will that military and financial expendi
ture, wffiich Mr. Balfour says the War Office and the Treasury have to meet, continue?
And presumably a contribution will be asked from India. It does not seem to me
that we have the slightest concern in this country, and why should we go there, even
reluctantly ?
LORD CURZON : We are arguing the whole case again and multiplying the
points you put the other day, which I tried ineffectually to answer. My answer
then was, and I can repeat it in a sentence, that we are there entirely against our
will and because we have been forced to go. Much against our will we have a force
at Batutn—the magnitude of which I have never been able to understand—and at
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