أوراق اللجنة الشرقية التابعة لمجلس الحرب [ظ‎‎١‎٩‎٩] (٥٤٤/٣٩٨)

16
MR. BALFOUR : This unhealthy curiosity on the p;u*t of our pro-consuls in
distant parts of the world is embarrassing.
LORD ROBERT CECIL : What that means is this. The unhappy man there
very naturally wants to know what kind of things he is to say to the local tribes : are
we going to be here permanently, or are we going to leave it as soon as we can ?
MR. BALFOUR : I should put it all upon the Conference.
LORD CURZON : I thought we were preparing the case for the Conference.
That is the object of these meetings. I was told that Sir Erie Richards had been
instructed by the Prime Minister to draw up a summary or brief for the Government.
Accordingly it was said, as the Eastern Committee has been managing these matters
for some time, that it would be a good thing to go over the whole of the areas one after
the other, discuss them, and enable Sir Erie Richards to form some conception as to
what the brief should be. Now that we are attempting to perform that task, Mi\
Balfour says : Why not postpone it to the Peace Conference? ’’ I am trying to help
you at the Peace Conference, Mr. Balfour, for you will be our chief representative there.
MR. BALFOUR : I do not think it is our business to have a policy with regard
to these places.
LORD CURZON : We shall get on very badly if we do not. I think we must
have an idea of what we are working for.
LORD ROBERT CECIL : I think that is the right thing. I am exceedingly
grateful to Lord Curzon for having put down in a number of propositions what he
thinks should be the policy. 1 have not exactly in mind what he has said, but what I
should like to say is that we would prefer not to have anything to do with the Caucasus
republics, that on the whole the balance of advantage of our going there is a very slight
one, and that we see considerable political disadvantages in our going there. Under
those circumstances we would prefer not to go there. If we are driven to it, and the
Peace Conference insists upon it, we would not actually refuse to go. That is the kind
of line, I think.
MR. BALFOUR : 1 agree, except as regards the last part. I think we really
must wait to know what other obligations are imposed upon us by the Conference, when
we have all cooled down and we know what our military forces are going to be after the
War. 1 would not say that we should arrange to do it if we are pressed ; but, if
pressed, we will consider whether it is within our powers. I should not mind that.
LORD ROBERT CECIL : That is the kind of thing I should like to see as our
policy. When we go to the Peace Conference, if we find there is any advantage
politically in the French going there, we should not mind their going there a bit.
MR. BALFOUR : I part company with you there.
LORD CURZON : I cannot agree with you either.
GENERAL SMUTS : What w’e should do is this. I agree with Mr. Balfour that
we should not increase our exposed military frontiers beyond what we have already,
which are very large indeed. If this is going to be a military proposition we should
not touch it, but 1 do not think it is really a military proposition. It need not be that.
You see, at the time the Conference comes on we shall be the only Power on the
spot. It is quite possible, after looking at the affairs of Trans-Caucasia, the.Conference
will come to the conclusion that these States cannot be sovereign independent States ;
thev will require a helping hand for some time to come, and there must be some
European Power, in some undefined way, looking after them. We shall be the only
Pow r er there, so the first party they must ask will be ourselves. They will say, “ Will
you look after this people in the meantime ? ” and 1 do not see how we can refuse it. If
we refuse it, of course they may offer it to France, and I think that is a dangerous
thing. I look upon the Sykes-Piect Agreement as a dangerous thing, and I look upon
extensions of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and giving a still greater area of intrigue to
France farther to the north as also dangerous.
LORD ROBERT CECIL: It will not be an extension of the Sykes-Picot Agree
ment, but will be something in exchange for the Sykes-Picot Agreement. .
GENERAL SMUTS: I am afraid of that. What will happen will be that we
shall go there with the idea of exchanging but that France will stick to both.