أوراق اللجنة الشرقية التابعة لمجلس الحرب [و‎‎١‎٦‎٤] (٥٤٤/٣٢٧)

LORD CURZON : We are now approaching the end of this discussion, which
has, I fear, become tedious to you, but it has brought us to this. There are only two
questions of immediate importance which we have still to settle. Are we to encou
rage Captain Wilson to proceed with this idea of getting the people to say, “ This
is what we want,” and, secondly, what are we to do about a figure-head?
LORD ROBERT CECIL : I agree. I do not think there is really a very great
deal of doubt about the broad lines of policy, for they have practically settled them
selves. We ought to have a British-controlled Government, and I do not think there
is any question at all that it ought to be in form an Arah Government. I go a little
further than that, and aim ultimately at, if possible, setting up an Arab Govern
ment, if we can create one, in a generation or so. The doubt is as to the man. So
far as that is concerned, personally I do not see anybody better than Abdullah. He
seems to me to he the best we can have. The Nakib is out of it. The new candidate
Captain Wilson has dug up, Hadi Pasha, is a fantastic proposal. It is only because
Captain-Wilson dislikes the idea of having Abdullah that he looks about for some
body else. Abdullah, from all I have heard of him, would do tolerably well if we
have the right man to control him. He is a cleverish fellow, I understand, and is
thought to be the cleverest of the Sherif’s sons. He is a sensualist, idle, and very
lazy.
LORD CURZON: Where has Abdullah been all this while?
LORD ROBERT CECIL: His father relies on him as his diplomatic son. I
should say, on the whole, he is the best we can do. The other thing is as to what
Captain Wilson should do, for 1 think it necessary to put in a word of caution.
LORD CURZON: Will you give us your views upon this? There is a final
suggestion in Captain Wilson’s telegram, that he would like to get Sir Percy Cox
at Baghdad, where his authority and influence are supreme. He asks, would it be
possible to send Sir Percy Cox there, and appoint him High Commissioner for the
time being, in order to .give the country time to get upon its legs, leaving the future
form of Arab rule to be settled after the passage of a certain amount of time, subject
to a promise that it will be instituted. This would amount to a guarantee of good
government to everybody concerned.
LORD ROBERT CECIL: I think 1 am against that on many grounds. I think
we have got a very difficult diplomatic position here. You have alluded to the
existence of the French Agreement. You have got to get rid of that somehow. We
can only get rid of it in one of two ways, or by a mixture of the two—by buying off
the French with some other concession, and by getting the Americans to assist us
with their pressure that our solution is the right one. Thirdly, we must have the
Arabs behind us, but 1 do not think it would be worth while to encourage Wilson
to get up counter-petitions and things that will not impress any intelligent people
at the Peace Conference, because they know the country is easily got at. Of course, a
good deal depends upon the kind of backing we get from people like Faisal. Faisal
will be there, and he will be listened to. He has distinguished himself in the war.
Therefore, from that point of view, it seems to me to be important to have the Arabs
behind us and to have Faisal behind us. I feel sure, from all the telegrams that have
come from Sir R. Wingate about Hussein, that he is very suspicious of anything
which leads him to think that we are not in earnest in setting up in some form or
another an Arab Government. That would react very badly, and if coincidently
there was an allegation of Hussein that he did not trust our pro-Arab feelings, that
would have a very disastrous result at the Peace Conference. I do not think we
can afford to have a quarrel with Hussein, that is the broad view I want to put
forward. The Americans will only support us if they think we are going in for some
thing in the nature of a native Government, and there are signs—I do not want to
say more about it here——that the Americans are not so friendly disposed to us as
they were, certainly as we hoped they would be in all these matters. Therefore, we
have to be careful, for the position ' is a difficult one. In a way the French are
in an unassailable position. If we cannot induce them in any way to abandon
the Agreement, we cannot go back on our signatures. We are in that positon; we
have signed it, and they have got us so far as that is concerned. T am anxious to do
nothing which will look as if we were not playing fair about it, and I am also anxious
to get the Arab feeling behind us, openly, as far as we can. That is all T have to say.
['365—42] ^