أوراق اللجنة الشرقية التابعة لمجلس الحرب [و‎‎١‎٣‎٥] (٥٤٤/٢٦٩)

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5. Sir C. Marling, in his reply (telegram No. 593 of the 2nd July, 1918), dealt
mainly with the immediate military situation, and the need for increased military
effort on the part of His Majesty’s Government. He did not mention the question
of an alliance, which appears to have been allowed to drop. It was revived by the
suggestion made by Sir C. Marling in his telegram No. 795 of the bth September,
that we should utilise the Persian Cossack Brigade against the Turk, “ a course
which, of course, will involve Persia in the war.” In a later telegram, No. 800 of
the 10th September, Sir C. Marling reported that the Persian Prime Minister, i.e.,
Vosugh-ed-Dowleh, was “ strongly in favour of joining us, and is willing to work to
this end.”
6. In a recent telegram (No. 67118 of the 25th September, 1918, to Bagdad),
the War Office expressed the view that “ it will be advantageous to us to have Persia
in as our ally, even if she is not an active one; for as long as she maintains her
neutrality, she might come in against us.”
(Initialled) T. E. S.
Political Department, India Office,
September 30, 1918.
PERSIA.
(E.C.-1765.)
Sir P. Cox to Mr. Balfour.—(Received October 2, 8 a.m.)
Tehran, October 1, 1918.
(No. 857.) (October 1, 5*30 p.m.)
PLEASE see Troopers telegram No. 67118, dated 25th September, to General
Bagdad, of which copy reached me simultaneously with your telegram No. 511 of
27th September.
Former was perhaps drafted before portent of Allenby’s victory was fully
apparent, but, in view of opinion expressed therein as to desirability of Persia entering
lists on our side, I venture to offer following appreciation of position as it appears
to me :—
There would be no difficulty in bringing Persia in, provided we could satisfy
certain essential conditions as stated below ; but her sole motives for coming in would
be in order to appear at Peace Conference as a belligerent, with hope of getting her
independence guaranteed internationally, and also of receiving a slice of Turkish
territory in neighbourhood of frontier as compensation for injuries suffered. As a
belligerent she would be a sleeping partner, and expect us to do the business.
Preliminary conditions would be, first, that we should demonstrate convincingly
that we have sufficient force on Kermanshah-Enzeli line to cope with any concentration
enemy might be able to bring against us, and to prevent any further incursions into
Persia. Secondly, that we should supply her with necessary funds in bullion, guns,
rifles, munitions, clothing, and equipment. First condition we were not in a position
to satisfy a week ago, but we may possibly be now as result of Palestine victory,
Second, so far as I can see, we could not satisfy either then or now.
Advantages we should derive from Persia coming in with us are: (1) Moral effect
of event in Afghanistan and India ; (2) certainty that she will not come in against us ;
(3) we should be in a more favourable position in many ways, such as control of
telegraphs and improvement of communications.
First advantage still holds good ; second is partly achieved by Palestine victory.
Disadvantages we suffer by her coming in are as follows : The only elements
Persia possesses of which military use could be forthwith made would be
(1) Starosselski and his Cossacks, and (2) Bakhtiaris and a few other small tribal
contingents. Neither would be of much military value. Starosselski, who has already
increased his brigade to a division of 6,000 men and expresses his ability to increase it
speedily to 1^00041 necessary, would play the leading role and be awkward at end of
war with a powerful armed force with which [? he would be] able, in accordance with
his declared ambition, to maintain Russia’s time-honoured footing in Northern Persia.
Similarly, Bakhtiaris, who can be very useful to us, and at the same time innocuous so
long as employed in their own country or on borders of it, would be able to arm and