أوراق اللجنة الشرقية التابعة لمجلس الحرب [ظ‎‎٣‎٦] (٥٤٤/٧٢)

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to, and definite instructions from, London. A telegram (E.C.-101)
had been received on the 7th instant from the G.O.C., Mesopotamia,
regarding the security of the Hamadan-Kasvin road. ihen,^on the
8th instant, Dunsterville had sent an important telegram (E.C.-49G)
saying that he had conferred recently with the Armenian leaders
from Baku, and that information from other sources gave him hope
that it might be possible to save Baku, which would also mean
control of the Caspian. He might possibly be at Baku with
Bicharakoff by the ^Oth June ; it depended on the nature of the
resistance of Kuchik Khan : and it was possible that lurkish tioops
might be there before them, but he thought he would be able to
hold out against a considerable Turkish force, 0I1 |y> however, if
Baku knew that actual British troops were coming. They would be
much encouraged in the first instance by the arrival of the armoured
car squadron, but he would like a battalion of British infantry and
a battery of field artillery to be also sent up as soon as possible.
He anticipated that great results might be achieved with this small
amount of troops. The telegram concluded with the information
that Bicharakoff and his partisans were to proceed to Enzeli the
following day. The Chairman thought that three things were clear
from this message :—
(a.) That Bicharakoff and his men had started ;
(6.) That Dunsterville wished to get to Baku ;
(c.) That Dunsterville contemplated a considerable military
expedition in order to anticipate the enemy and achieve great
results. To this the War Office had replied to the General Officer
Commanding, Mesopotamia, that it was presumed that he had
communicated to General Dunsterville the substance of their recent
telegrams, which contained the policy laid down by the Government.
Then, on the 6th June, Mr. Macdonnell wired from Baku that, if it
became known that no British assistance could be expected there,
the result would be that the Armenians would go over to Turkey
and the Bolsheviks would probably go over to Germany, thus
making it impossible to ensure the safety of the fleet or to destroy
the stocks. It was thought at' Tiflis that Baku could not hold out
against an attack for any length of time. This telegram the
Chairman thought was rather surprising, for it emanated from a
man who, a very short time ago, had been urging that only one or
two officers should proceed to Baku. Lastly, there was a telegram
from our military agent for the Caucasus, which stated that the
situation in Northern Caucasus was at the moment quiet ; that it
was reported that Bostov had been captured by the Bolsheviks ;
that there were signs that the latter might change their policy and
become more amenable to Baku; and that it would be very inadvis
able for Dunsterville to make any move at present on Baku, as it
was necessary to arrive at a working basis and proper understanding
with the Bolsheviks, who at present were suspicious of our policy
and aspirations. The Chairman thought that too much importance
should not be attached to this telegram, as it was dated the
16th May.
The above was the situation so far as our information went,
and, as far as he could see, there seemed to be nothing that the
Committee could do at present.
General Macdonogh said that he thought either General Dunster
ville had not been kept fully informed or else he had not quite
grasped the situation. It was ridiculous to send a small force and
the armoured-car squadron to Baku. Information received by us
on the 2f)th May was to the effect that two Turkish regiments had
passed through Tiflis on their way to Baku on the 22nd of that
month. The only force holding Baku consisted of some 4,000
Bolsheviks and some 3,000 Armenians. Baku itself had no defences,
and consequently considerable forces would be required to hold it.
We had also heard that there were two German battalions at Poti,