أوراق اللجنة الشرقية التابعة لمجلس الحرب [و‎‎٢‎٩] (٥٤٤/٥٧)

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The Chairman pointed out that Mr. MacDonnell’s telegram
asked that BicharakofT should he informed that the Bolsheviks were
sending some of their own troops down from Baku to Enzeli.
Lord TL Cecil interpreted this to mean that the Bolsheviks
were going to Enzeli so that BicharakofT could go to Baku.
General Smuts agreed with this interpretation ; the message
meant that BicharakofT was prepared to go north if a friendly force
from the north came to Enzeli.
Colonel Steel agreed it was necessary to secure Enzeli before
BicharakofT and Dunsterville could start, and that was the reason
why 300 Bolsheviks were going there.
General Radcliffe said the policy advocated by the War Office
was to get the Caspian fleet away from Baku and to control the
Caspian. This his department regarded as important; but in
other respects it was most undesirable to embark on new commit
ments and to depart from the policy laid down by the Eastern
Committee. The War Office principle was to leave the G.O.C.,
Mesopotamia, to decide what force was necessary to carry out that
policy. General Marshall’s mobile motor-car scheme had been
endorsed by the Committee, and action was being taken accordingly.
In his opinion it might be feasible to send one British officer to Baku,
but this was quite a different matter from detaching a force there.
Mr. Montagu’s view was that what was necessary was to
concentrate at Enzeli and to send an agent through to consolidate
the friendly elements and to get the fleet to Enzeli.
Lord Hardinge pointed out that Enzeli was a very indifferent
port. From his own experience it was sometimes impossible to
land there, and ships could not remain for any length of time. Baku
was a really useful port, and the Caspian fleet was probably concen
trated there. Astara was another possible port.
The Chairman assumed that the object of getting hold of the
fleet was to prevent its use for transport purposes across the
Caspian.
Lord R. Cecil said that in spite of the great weight of authority
against him, he was still in favour of General Dunstervilie’s proposals.
General Dunsterville was an officer of experience, and had a high
reputation in India. He had been a long time in the district, and
was aware of all the difficulties and dangers. He had been to Enzeli,
and was acquainted with the local conditions au'd circumstances in the
Caucasus. He was not a man to put up a madcap scheme, and must
have good reasons for the advice he had given. He had in fact
brought over Sir C. Marling to his view.
Lord Robert agreed as to the danger of dissipating one’s forces,
but there must be exceptions to this principle. Further, there were
thousands of Armenians who were still in the Caucasus, and possibly
General Dunsterville thought that if he could get hold of them he
would thereby do more to protect Northern Persia than by holding
the Hamadan-Kasvin line.
Mr. Montagu said that in order to get to Baku, General Dunster
ville had virtually suggested the abandonment of that line.
The Chairman thought the proposal in its larger aspect was a
gigantic gamble. In arriving at a decision, the Committee were
considerably embarrassed owing to the fluctuating advice given by
Sir C. Marling.
Lord Robert Cecil suggested that a telegram might be sent to
this effect: “ We are unaware of the local circumstances. We
regard it essential to hold the Hamadan-Kasvin line. If
General Dunsterville can proceed without prejudice to this, we are
prepared to act on your advice.”
General Smuts agreed it was a gamble for big stakes. No doubt
General Dunsterville would take a number of his officers and non
commissioned officers with him. The G.O.C., Mesopotamia,
however* would not permit any troops to accompany him and the
Eastern Committee must accept General Marshall’s decision in