‏"ملخص الأحداث والتدابير الرئيسية التي اتخذها سمو نائب الملك اللورد كرزون من كيدلستون، نائب الملك والحاكم العام للهند. الجزء I - الخليج الفارسي." [و‎‎٣‎٣] (٩٢/٧٠)

70
* Tr7 ue A°?i y n e 1Cat A romairiin ^ unsettled at the end of 1903 was that
Khor AMnliah At the beginning of February 1902, when it became known
that Safwan and Urn Kasr had been occupied by the Turks, Lord Curzon su^-
gested that the Porte should be pressed to withdraw their posts from the border
of Koweit and His Majesty’s Government in reply sanctioned the despatch of a
gunboat to Khor Abdullah to ascertain the facts; the voyage of H.M.S. “Sphinx ”
which was immediately sent, resulted in confirmation of the n'ews about Safwan
and Um Kasr and in the discovery of a new Turkish post on the island of Bubi-
yan. His Majesty s Government considered that, on the information available
as to the previous ownership of these places, they would not be safe in contend
ing that the Turkish occupation was a breach of the status quo or justified in
demanding its cessation, but the Porte was informed that the establishment by
them of garrisons at Um Kasr and on Bubiyan could not be regarded as pre
judicing the rights of the Sheikh of Koweit at either place. In March 1902, when
Hejeje appeared to be threatened with a Turkish occupation, Lord Curzon urged
that the lurks and the Sheikh of Koweit should both be informed that the west
ern shores of Khor Subbiyeh were regarded as being within the limits of Koweit
and that encroachment upon them by the Turks would not be tolerated ; but His
Majesty’s Government, while prepared in fact to resist a Turkish advance along
Khor Subbiyeh, considered it advisable that discussions on the subject should
be avoided. At the end of November 1903 Lord Curzon, as we have seen, paid
a visit to Khor Abdullah, and on his return to India he hastened to impress
on His Majesty’s Government the results of his personal observations. In his
opinion it was now impossible to press for a Turkish withdrawal from Um Kasr,
but the case of Bubiyan island was altogether different. In the case of Bubiyan
the claims of the Sheikh of Koweit appeared to be sustainable; moreover, if the
island were to pass into the possession of the power that held Um Kasr, the
upper part of Khor Abdullah, the most suitable terminus for the Baghdad Rail
way, would become an impregnable harbour; whereas if Bubiyan were recog
nised as a part of Koweit the British Government would have at their disposal
a position, dominating the Khor, which would go far to render innocuous the
proceedings there of any Foreign Department. Lord Curzon accordingly
advised that the Turks should be required to evacuate Bubiyan and that, on
their doing so, a post should be established at the north end of the island by
the British Government on behalf of the Sheikh of Kow'eit; or, if a less pro
nounced course of action were preferred, a threat of assisting the Sheikh to
establish a post at the north end of the island might be employed with a view
to bringing about the withdrawal of the Turks, after which further measures
of precaution could be taken as required. In May 1901 the removal of the
Bubiyan post was pressed upon the Porte, but it was not obtained, and in March
1905 Lord Curzon again returned to the subject which he regarded as of the
u most importance. His Majesty’s Government, however, after some months
of discussion, intimated that they were not prepared to take immediate action
and that the question would be referred to the Committee of Imperial Defence.
The necessity that there should be a British official to watch Koweit
affairs was recognised by Lord Curzon in June 1903 when he recommended
that, if an Indian officer were appointed to Mohammerah, Koweit should be
included in his charge and a gunboat provided which would enable him to visit
the place from time to time. In July 1903 Sir N. O’Conor, the British Am
bassador at Constantinople, suggested that a political officer should be posted
exclusively to Koweit for the purpose of controlling the actions of the Sheikh.
As an alternative to the Mohammerah scheme, which he still preferred, Lord
Curzon supported the proposal of Sir N. O’Conor ; he thought that it would
afford substantial evidence of the intention of Britain to preserve and utilise
the privileges which she already enjoyed at Koweit, that it would make it
possible to obtain more reliable information of events in Central Arabia, that
it would bring Turkish proceedings on the Koweit border under closer observa
tion, and that it would strength the right of Britain to a controlling voice in
the ultimate destination of the Baghdad Railway. His Majesty s Government
however were not at this time disposed to acquiesce either in Lord Curzon s
proposals or in those or Sir N. O’Conor ; they considered that the appointment
C133FD