‏"ملخص الأحداث والتدابير الرئيسية التي اتخذها سمو نائب الملك اللورد كرزون من كيدلستون، نائب الملك والحاكم العام للهند. الجزء I - الخليج الفارسي." [ظ‎‎٢‎٧] (٩٢/٥٩)

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trouble than the Customs difficulty. The Sheikh had long stood in fear of Ali,
over whose actions he had little or no control, and as early as 1897 he had
pressed strongly for the recognition by the Government of India of his own
son Hamad as his lawful heir and successor. In 1899 it had been decided to
recognise the claims of Hamad, but announcement of the decision was with
held until 1901 inconsequence of the Sheikh’s attitude in the customs question ;
when it was at length communicated to Sheikh Isa he shed tears of gratitude,
hut this was the only return which he ever made for a favour without precedent
in the history of British relations with the Persian Gulf. In 1899 the quarrel
between Ali and his uncle, which related partly to property and partly to
political matters, had been adjusted by a family council ; but at the beginning
of 1904, the formal recognition of Hamad having meanwhile taken place, it
broke out afresh and the town of Manamah became the scene of numerous
excesses committed by a gang of ruffians whom Aii had collected round him.
.In September 1904 some of Ali’s followers assaulted a German merchant at
Manamah, and in the month of November following they stirred up an anti-
Shiah riot in which several inoffensive Persians were brutally beaten. In
December Major Cox, the British Itesident in the Persian Gulf, visited Bahrein
and secured a satisfactory settlement of the German merchant’s case, the
ringleaders being flogged and a sum of Bs. 1,000 paid as compensation ; but
in the Persian case the Sheikh was impracticable, insisting that it should be
tried by the Shara courts of the islands in which there was no hope of justice for
Shiahs against Sunnis. After consultation between the Government of India
and His Majesty’s Government an ultimatum, backed by naval force, was
eventually presented to the Sheikh on the 2 >th of February 11 05 ; it required
the banishment of Ali for five years, the expulsion of the ringleaders in both
cases from Bahrein, the payment of compensation to the injured Persians and
the maintenance of efficient bazar guard in the town of Manamah. On the
following day the Sheikh submitted and complied with the terms of the ultima
tum except those relating to Ali and his associates ; Ali’s property was attached,
but Ali himself and the other ringleaders evaded arrest and succeeded in
escaping to El Katr. In August, however, Ali surrendered himself and was
deported to India for a period of five years ; some of the other outlaws who
accompanied him were sent for six months to an Indian jail. The terms of the
ultimatum as delivered were generally in accordance wflth the recommendations
of the Government of India ; but whereas Lord Curzon had suggested that, in
event of forcible measures becoming necessary, the Customs House should be
seized and only be restored with a British official in charge, His Majesty’s
Government considered that the connection between the customs difficulty and
the lawlessness of Ali was too remote to w r arrantthe adoption of such a measure.
The direct results of the crisis were satisfactory, but still there was no
improvement in the Sheikh’s general attitude; he continued to resist the pro
posed reform of his customs administration, and the internal government of the
islands was highly unsatisfactory and was characterised by gross oppression of
the aboriginal Baharineh. In 1901, in connection with the growth of foreign
interests in Bahrein, Lord Curzon had indicated that it was advisable that
steps should be taken at an early date to place the British position in Bahrein
upon a more assured and definite footing, and after the crisis of 1905 he con
sidered that a clear decision was required regarding the nature and limits of
of the British protectorate, so far as it had yet been developed. His Majesty’s
Government, however, held that the time for defining in strict terms the posh
tmn of the Sheikh of Bahrein towards the protecting British power had not
yet arrived; but they concurred in Lord Curzon’s further suggestions and
requested that the political authorities in the Persian Gulf should be instructed
to act “by steadily, and as far as possible unobtrusively, increasing their in-
fluence and the conbdence of the Sheikh in thir advice and power to direct
and control his external affan-s . r I he preposterous claims which both Turkey
and Persia entertain to sovereigniy over Bahrein were resisted in a suitable
manner during Lord Curzon’s viceroyalty : in 1905 Turkey was reminded that
the islands were under British protection, discussion of recent incidents in
Bahrein bemg at the same time refused; and in 1904 negotiations for the