‏"ملخص الأحداث والتدابير الرئيسية التي اتخذها سمو نائب الملك اللورد كرزون من كيدلستون، نائب الملك والحاكم العام للهند. الجزء I - الخليج الفارسي." [و‎‎٢‎١] (٩٢/٤٦)

58
General history.
Oman and Gwadur.
at Koweit the prohibition of the trade was little better than a dead letter; but
in the case of that port the existence of the traffic was less detrimental to British
interests than it was elsewhere.
We come at length to the general history, since 1899, of the states and
principalities adjoining Persian Gulf; it
is composed for the most part of events
which on the one hand were of more than purely internal significance and on
the other, with certain exceptions, did not enter into the arena of European
interests. This general history relates for the most part to transactions with the
local authorities in which Britain has been concerned, acting in some cases on
her account hut in others on behalf of clients from among the local authorities
themselves ; for the various governments in the Gulf have few direct dealings
of importance with one another, and in matters affecting more than one juris
diction it is seldom that Britain does not figure either as an intermediary or an
arbiter.
Since 1895, in which yeartheltown of Maskat was captured by rebellious
Arabs while the local representatives of the
British Government preserved an attitude
of neutrality, the relations of the Sultan of Oman with the Government of
India had been steadily deteriorating, and at the time of Lord Curzon’s arrival
in India a point had been reached at which it was necessary to resort to dras
tic remedies. The proceedings of the French gunboats “ Gabes ” and “ Scor
pion ” have already been mentioned, as also the virtual grant of Bunder Jisseh
by the Sultan to the French. The action of the Sultan in this case contraven
ed an agreement with the British Government into which lie had entered in
1891, never to alienate or otherwise give for occupation, unless to Great Britain,
any part of the territories or dependencies of Oman. Various other questions
were also outstanding at this time between Saiyid Faisal and the Government
of India ; and on the 24th of January 1899 Lord Curzon proposed to instruct
Colonel Meade, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, to deal with these
unsettled cases, and to inform the Sultan that the subsidy paid to him by Gov
ernment would be withheld until they were disposed of; in view of the Sultan’s
recent intrigues and evident disloyalty Lord Curzon considered that a serious
warning was also required, and he consulted His Majesty’s Government as to
the terms in which it should be administered. On the 25th of January the
Secretary of State for India authorised the Viceroy to remind the Sultan of
the favours which had been heaped upon him by the British Government and
to admonish him that, in event of his attitude continuing to be unfriendly, the
support of that Government would he withdrawn and might possibly take
another direction: in order to compel a settlement of outstanding questions the
Secretary of State was prepared to approve of any measures, not inconsistent
with the Anglo-French .Declaration of 1862 and not requiring French concur
rence, which Lord Curzon might consider likely to be efficacious. Under the
sanction thus conveyed a memorandum was prepared by Lord Curzon for com
munication to the Sultan, and Colonel Meade was ordered to proceed to Maskat
where he arrived in the first week of February; Lord Curzon bad meanwhile
directed, upon his own responsibility, that a demand for the cancellation of the
concession to the French should be added to the memorandum before presen
tation,—-a step which the Sultan’s admission of the grant to the French, its in
compatibility with the terms of the British agreement of 1891 and the undesir
ability of ignoring on such an occasion the principal ground of offence combined
to render necessary. On the 7th of February Colonel Meade reported the inclu
sion of the additional demand in the memorandum and suggested that, as the
Sultan appeared to relv on French support, the use of compulsion should be
authorised even to the extent of employing naval force if necessary. This re
quest, subject to the condition that collision with the French should he avoid
ed, was recommended by Lord Curzon to His Majesty’s Government on the
ground that, at the stage which matters had reached, defiance by the Sultan of
the British power could not be permitted. His Majesty’s Government, while
they considered that the demand for cancellation of the French concession
somewhat exceeded the limits of their previous instructions, agreed that, if it had
already been presented, compulsion (as proposed by Lord Curzon) might be em
ployed to enforce the Sultan’s compliance with it as well as with the other
C133FI)