‏"ملخص الأحداث والتدابير الرئيسية التي اتخذها سمو نائب الملك اللورد كرزون من كيدلستون، نائب الملك والحاكم العام للهند. الجزء I - الخليج الفارسي." [و‎‎٥] (٩٢/١٤)

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Chapter IV.
THE PERSIAN GULP.
ft X should regard the concession of a port upon the
“ Persian Gulf to Russia by any power as a deliberat e insult
“ to Great Britain, as a wanton rupture of the stains quo, and
«< as a n intentional provocation to war ; and I should impeach
“ the British minister, who was guilty of ^acquiescing in such
“ a sui render, as a traitor to his country/’
—Extract from Eord Curzon s
“ Persia and the Persian
Question ”, Volume 11,
page 465.
In the Viceroyalty of Lord Curzon the question of the Persian Gulf rose
to a prominence greater than it naa
Unparalleled prominence of the Per- attained at any time since the beginning
sian Gulf question. g r itish rule in India, and the position
of Great Britain in that region was assailed with much energy by other
European powers, especially by Russia and France. The c''anc 8 bywh,chthe
conflict was timed was in one respect singularly fortunate, for Lord Curzon
had at an earlier period made a close study of the Persian Gulf pro >lem an
was deeply impressed with its importance. Several years before he had even
foreshadowed the policy which it would behove the British Government o
adopt in case of the appearance of European rivalry in the Gulf, and :n the
execution of that very policy he was now, as head of the Government of India,
himself to take a leading part.
The principal ohiects of Russia were the creation of a naval base in the
^ Persian Gulf, and the construction ot a
Russian designs. Russian railway across Persia by which
the resources of the Russian Empire could be brought to bear for its support;
these objects she set herself to compass partly by direct and partly by indirect
means. In 1899 it was reported from Tehran that the Russians had acquired
from Persia certain rights in a Persian Gulf port, and two later the
statement was confirmed by the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs at Con
stantinople, while almost simultaneously the St. Petersburg A/iedomosti
advocated the acquisition of Bunder Abbas together with the islands of Kishm
Heniam, Lart.k and Hormuz in order to provide a terminus for a Russian rail-
wav across Persia. The existence of a Russo-Persian agreement regar mg a
port in the Gulf was denied by the Persian Government, but the proceedings
of Russian ships and railway surveyors soon furnished corroboration of the
prevailing rumours. We shall consider first the direct means used by Russia
to promote her schemes for a naval base and a strategic railway.
The attention of Russia was at first attracted by the harbour of
In 1898 a Russian, Count Kapmst, had
Russian quest of a naval base. obtained from the Porte a concession for
a railway to run from Tripoli in Syria to Koweit, and early in 1899 a party
of Russo-Armenian spies were set at work m Ivoweit by the Russian Consul-
General in Turkish Arabia; the designs of Russia m this direction were
frustrated, however, by an engagement with the British Government into
which the Shaikh of Koweit entered at the beginning of 1899 and by which
he bound himself not to alienate any portion of his territory to foreigners.
Koweit was visited by Russian war-vessels in 1900, 190- and 1903 ; hut from
1899 onwards it was clear that Russia had abandoned her interest m the
place in favour of schemes better adapted to promote her policy in Persia.
The first point on the Persian side threatened with a Russian occupa
tion was Bunder Abbas, to which the warnings received from lehran and
Constantinople probably referred, and which had been specifically mentioned
Cl 3FD