مجموعة ‎٢٨ /٩٥ "بلاد فارس. العلاقات مع الحكومة البريطانية.‏ المطالبات الخاصة ضد الحكومة البريطانية‏: قضية السفينة البخارية "كارا دينيز‏"." [و‎‎٩‎٣] (٦٩١/١٨٥)

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so simple. There appear to be two classes of cases—those due to the advance of
enemy forces invading Persia and those due to local uprisings, fostered it may be
by enemy agents working on the minds of tribes over whom the Persian Govern
ment seem to have exercised but a scanty control. In the first, the argument may
perhaps be that when Turkish forces invaded Persia, ostensibly on the ground
^ that there were already some Russian troops there, it was the business of the
Persian Government to keep them out, and that, as they failed to do so, losses
sustained by British officials and subjects who were forced to depart in the face
of this enemy invasion were losses for which the Persian Government are liable.
There is obviously some contentious matter here. In the second, it seems clearer
that the local populations, even if misled by enemy intriguers, were the actual
offenders, even though it may be doubtful if the Persian Government had the
means to control them. As regards (3), the claims of the Imperial Bank of Persia
and its staff have already been referred to in paragraphs 29 and 30 above; while,
as regards (4), highway robberies and other outrages were, of course, more
frequent during the war period than in others, owing to the disorganised state of
the country.
54. As regards our claims for war losses there seems little doubt that if
these are advanced before an arbitral tribunal, the Persian Government will, on
their part, advance counter-claims against us for Persian losses during this
period. There are several references in the Legation correspondence to their
intention to advance claims of this nature against the belligerent Powers who
carried on operations in Persia; in that relating to Legation claim No. 29, e.g.,
they said they hoped, when the questions of the war were decided, to obtain
considerable compensation for damage to Persia and its inhabitants from the
operations of the belligerent Powers. It seems unlikely that they will obtain
much in this way from either Russia or Turkey—and there seems no evidence
that they have tried to do so—but they may hope to obtain some from us, more
especially when the opportunity is afforded them of setting off their claims against
ours; while their assessment of any damage they can lay at our doors is not likely
to err on the side of moderation. We have already had indication of one large
claim—that of one Atychides for a ship condemned by our prize court at Bombay,
in which a figure of some £900,000 is mentioned—and research will doubtless
provide them with further opportunities in this direction. A despatch of
Sir R. Clive s of the 4th May, 1929, said that they were engaged in drawing up
a list of counter-claims for damage done during the occupation of Persia by
foreign armies in the period 1914-21; and in a further despatch of the
15th June, 1929, he gave his impression that their intention was to resist any
possibility of a cash payment to us by presenting counter-claims arising out of
the occupation of Persia by British forces during the war. In this event the total
of their claims would probably far exceed ours, and this consideration—coupled
with doubts as to the fate before an arbitral tribunal of our own war-time claims,
when the conditions to which Persia, which early in the war declared its
neutrality, was exposed at the hands of the contending belligerent Powers, came
under review before that tribunal—has led us recently to the proposal that the
terms of any agreement, which might be ultimately reached for the settlement of
claims should exclude losses of a non-contractual kind incurred between the
4th August, 1914, and the 22nd February, 1921, the date when the last British
troops left Persia. If this proposal should be eventually adopted it will
materially reduce the total of our outstanding claims against Persia, as shown
in the approximate figures given in paragraph 39 above.
56. Questions of damage done by British troops in Persia arose in 1919,
when, as supplementary to the agreement of the 9th August, 1919, between His
Majesty’s Government and the Persian Government, notes were exchanged on
the 9th-10th August, 1919, between Sir P. Cox and Vossug-ed-Dowleh for the
waiver of claims on the respective sides for the cost of maintenance of those
troops and any damage done by them in Persia, but leaving the claims of
individuals and private institutions to be dealt with independently. The latter
clause was doubtless meant to safeguard our own claims, but it leaves the door
open to Persian claims also. These notes are shown on pp. 167-8 of our printed
correspondence respecting the affairs of Persia, 1919 (Confidential 11601). The
agreement mentioned and its annexes provided by their terms neither for ratifica
tion nor denunciation, and must be assumed therefore to have possessed validity
as from the date of their signature. The correspondence, however, shows that the
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