مجموعة ١١١/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. كرمانشاه - يوميّات سياسية." [ظ‎‎٨] (٧٥١/١٧)

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terrain favouring the latter) and has used the small and insufficiently organised
forces at his disposal only for minor patrol operations against brigands.
Reinforcements from Khuzistan, which General Shahbakhti was expecting to
receive here during this month, have not arrived; operations against the Kurds
are, therefore, not likely to be embarked upon for some time to come, even if there
should be a breakdown in the Kurdistan negotiations which General Shahbakhtj^v
has started.
3. Situation in Kurdistan.
General Shahbakhti spent about a week in Kurdistan during the middle of
November and began his efforts for settling the Kurdistan problem by negotia
tions with the Kurdish rebels. He achieved some measure of success by winning
over the important Galbaghi tribe and coming to terms with its leaders, who were
confirmed in their position of authority in their tribal area (Marivan district).
By treating these tribesmen with consideration and generosity he seems to have
ensured that calm will be maintained in the Marivan district, but the Persian
Government has not actually re-established full authority in that district.
In the meantime, Northern Kurdistan remains outside the control of the
Persian authorities and continues to be held and administered by the Kurdish
rebels, the most influential of whom is Mohamed Rashid Vineh. General
Shahbakhti has not yet come into personal contact with the above named, hut it
is reported that he has made preliminary moves to get in touch with them through
intermediaries. It is too early as yet to attempt to forecast the course of events
in Kurdistan.
4. Economic Situation.
The local bazaars have been rather more active this month than during the
previous three months as a result of the improved state of public security. While
there is a fair supply of local produce (e.g., ghee, meat, tea, wool, and even wheat),
there is a shortage of certain products, especially sugar, cotton goods, charcoal
and, to some extent, rice.
The local population has shown some uneasiness over the food situation here
and there was a C£ wheat riot ” at Hamadan on the 19th November. Actually,
any fears which the population of this district may feel with regard to a food
shortage in the near future seem to me to be almost groundless. This is a rich
grain-growing district and, even when harvests are well below average, the grain
produced is more than is required for local needs. Even allowing for the fact
that some wheat has been destroyed in the course of the brigandage and raiding
of the past three months, the total grain produced this year is almost equal to
the average of the total production for previous years. The peasants of the
countryside have hidden reserves and are least likely to suffer from any shortage
of grain. Stocks in the towns of Kermanshah and Hamadan also are reported
to be sufficient almost to last until next year’s wheat crop is harvested. Exact
details regarding the wheat situation in Sanandaj, Malayyir and Qasr-i-Shirin
are not at present available, but there is no reason to believe that stocks of grain
there are small and that a shortage is likely to occur before next year’s grain is
available. A different state of affairs may be produced if an attempt is made
to meet Tehran’s requirements during the next six months by drawing too freely
upon the stocks in this district.
The food situation here is unsatisfactory owing to the recent increase in the
prices of nearly all commodities. Bread is sold in Kermanshah at 3 rials per
batman (6| lb.) in defiance of instructions received from Tehran that its price
should be 4 or 4| rials a batman. Despite this, bread is too dear for the poorest
classes to buy enough of it to keep body and soul alive, and a large proportion of
the population is therefore living in a perpetual state of under-nourishment and
misery.
The sugar situation remains serious, for local stocks will shortly run out.
The Shahabad Sugar Factory started production in the middle of November—
three weeks later than usual—but this year’s output (i.e., 1,200 tons) is expected
to be much smaller than the average for the past four years, i.e., 9,000 kharvars
= 2,700 tons. The falling off is the result of a smaller beet crop this year caused
by frosts last spring and insect pests, which damaged a large percentage of the
crop; production is also likely to be reduced because a small percentage of the