"سجلّات وأوراق خاصة باللجان الخمس المعنية بالشرق الأدنى والشرق الأوسط" [و‎‎٢‎٩] (١١٠/٥٧)

9 .
possible. On the whole, the line of least resistance seems to
be that indicated in clause 3 of the French Ambassador^ Note
^ of the 26th December, i.e. the offer pf French fiminaial
experts. It is accordingly su^ested that the French G-ovemmen
might be informed that H.M’s Grovemraent cordially accept their
offer of co-operation, and suggest, as a first step, their
talking immediate -etepe to place a number of qualified experts
at the disposal of the Persian Government to assist in the
superintendence of Persian Finance. The disirability of
avoiding the use of the word "control' 1 or similar phrases,
might be informally irapfessed upon them. It is for considera-
not
tion whether the French offer might/be accompanied by some
guarded reference to a future loan. An j;Mediate loan is
clearly out of the question.
8, The objection that the appointment of French
financial exper^tj would conflict with the financial claases of
the so-called "August iigreement", i.e. the arrangement
embodied in the idaglo-Russian Note to the Persian Government of
the 4th August, 1916, may presumably be disregarded. The
clauses in question, which contemplated extending the
functions of the "ikdxed (Anglo-Russo-Persian) Financial
Commission", appointed to deal "Moratorium" advances, to a
general supervision of Persian finances, have never been put
into operation; and in any case, whatever view may be taken
as to the continued validity of our treaty obligations to
Russia, it can hardly be held, in existing circumstances, that
we are still bound to her in respect of a mere working
arrangement of this kind. A stronger objection may perhaps be
urged, on broad grounds of policy, to allowing French
financial influecne, with its somewhat dubious record, to gain
a foothold at Tehran. But the situation is so serious that
risks of this kind must be taken.